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ABSTRACT
With the worldwide revolution in financial technology (“FinTech”),
Peer-to-Peer (“P2P”) lending, an alternative funding channel, has
grown rapidly over the past decade. P2P lending benefits digital
financial inclusion by providing an online platform to facilitate direct
trades between borrowers and lenders with limited intermediation by
traditional financial institutions. During P2P lending transactions, a
significant amount of transaction records are accumulated, thus
creating a FinTech-driven credit assessment mechanism to help
underserved borrowers, who are often turned down by traditional
financial intermediaries, obtain credit. P2P lending business models as
well as government responses to those models differ. For example, the
United States has been reactive, requiring platforms to fully comply with
the extant securities regulation, while China, though initially hands-off,
has also become reactive, limiting P2P platforms to the information
intermediation model due to a series of P2P failures. Taiwan’s
regulatory response to P2P lending, led by its Financial Supervisory
Commission (“FSC”), the sole financial market watchdog in Taiwan,
started as reactive, warning that the P2P lending industry should not
cross four major red lines drawn under existing regulatory and business
structures. The Taiwanese government, however, has become more
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proactive—at least in form, introducing the Financial Technology
Development and Innovative Experimentation Act (the “FinTech
Sandbox Act”) to permit cautious regulatory experimentation. Though a
positive effort, this act may, in substance, be an ineffective means to
address the regulatory dilemma between prudential regulation and
financial competition and innovation. This is because the government
lacks the institutional incentive to replace the existing regulatory regime
with something truly proactive. We propose a structural change in the
current institutional design that could reallocate the authority of
financial competition and innovation to a more motivated financial
agency, separate from and independent of the FSC, that would be better
positioned to safeguard financial competition and innovation enabled by
FinTech.
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INTRODUCTION
With the growth of financial technology (“FinTech”), many internet
technology companies, having accumulated a large number of users and
transaction records via online platforms, have begun to provide financial
services without significant intermediation by traditional financial
institutions. Since the first Peer-to-Peer (“P2P”) lending platform was
launched in 2005, this type of FinTech transaction has turned into a
global market with a variety of distinct business models and promising
growth rates. 1 In general, P2P or marketplace lending is defined as
“lending money to borrowers without going through a traditional
financial intermediary such as a bank.”2 P2P platforms apply innovative
credit scoring models which are “heavily data-driven, employ semiautomated risk assessment methods[,] and leverage nontraditional data
points.” 3 These models and techniques help borrowers who face
challenges when trying to obtain credit through traditional channels
acquire loans, thus enhancing digital financial inclusion.4 However, new
risks may emerge from financial innovation. For example, derivatives
and securitization could transfer and alter risk in a sophisticated way,
which—due to their risk-shifting characteristics—could, in turn,

1. The Future of Fintech—A Paradigm Shift in Small Business Finance, WORLD ECONOMIC
FORUM
12
(Oct.
2015),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/IP/2015/FS/GAC15_The_Future_of_FinTech_Paradigm_Shift_Small_
Business_Finance_report_2015.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Tobias Berg, Valentin Burg, Ana Gombović, & Manju Puri, On the Rise of FinTechs –
Credit Scoring Using Digital Footprints 28 (NBER Working Paper No. w24551,
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3163781 (“Particularly in developing countries, the inability of the
unbanked population to participate in financial services is often caused by a lack of information
infrastructure, such as credit bureau scores. Many countries have therefore already started leveraging
digital technologies to promote financial inclusion.”). For digital financial inclusion, see also G20 HighLevel Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion, GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION i
(2016),
http://www.gpfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/G20%20High%20Level%20Principles%20for%20Dig
ital%20Financial%20Inclusion%20-%20Full%20version-.pdf (noting that in this digital era, digital
financial inclusion benefits efficient interconnection between participants in the market, and that the
method of creating adaptive regulatory approaches and the method for accelerating the use of digital
technologies will be crucial to improve financial access and achieve universal financial inclusion).
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contribute to the global financial crisis.5 Similarly, in the case of P2P
lending, “the general misalignment of interest has been raised as critical,
as marketplaces issue loans but often don’t retain any risk.” 6 When the
credit issued is of lower quality, the risk of default will increase. 7 We
can thus observe some inherent systemic risks with unforeseeable
consequences on P2P platforms.8
In addition, a finding by Transparency Market Research even states
that the opportunity in the global P2P market will be worth $897.85
billion by 2024, an increase from $26.16 billion in 2015.9 In light of the
increase in P2P lending over the past decade, many financial regulators
across jurisdictions have attempted to “balance the traditional regulatory
objectives of financial stability and consumer protection—the focus of
post-Crisis regulatory changes—with the objectives of promoting
growth and innovation” in the past several years. 10 Because the
Financial Supervisory Commission (“FSC”), which is the sole financial
market watchdog in Taiwan charged with both consumer protection and
prudential regulation, is inclined to adopt a conservative civil-law
approach by setting forth detailed rules that market participants must
follow, the development of FinTech-enabled financial services such as
P2P lending would be restrained due to the regulatory gap.11
In reality, even though the Taiwanese government has, in form,
become more proactive by enacting the Financial Technology
Development and Innovative Experimentation Act (the “FinTech
Sandbox Act”), an official regulatory sandbox to permit cautious
regulatory experimentation, the FSC, in substance, might actually be

5. Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Janos N. Barberis, & Douglas W. Arner, Regulating a
Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 3637 (2017).
6. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 1, at 16.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 17.
9. Peer-to-Peer Lending Market - Global Industry Analysis, Size, Share, Growth, Trends and
Forecast
2016
–
2024,
TRANSPARENCY
MARKET
RESEARCH
(2016),
https://www.transparencymarketresearch.com/peer-to-peer-lending-market.html (last visited July 4,
2018).
10. Zetzsche et al., supra note 5, at 34.
11. Fa Zhan Jin Rong Ke Ji, Jian Li Si Wei Yao Tiao Zheng [Regulatory Philosophy Need Be
Adapted in Facilitating Financial Technology], GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Oct.
9, 2017) (Taiwan), http://opinion.chinatimes.com/20171009000028-262113 (noting the incumbent
Chairman Gu of the FSC emphasized that the Taiwanese legal system is a civil law system and that
unless authorized by statutes or regulations administrative agencies have difficulty in permitting the
provision of financial products or services not yet authorized). For a discussion on the FSC charged with
both consumer protection and prudential regulation, see Chang-hsien Tsai, Choosing Among Authorities
for Consumer Financial Protection in Taiwan: A Legal Theory of Finance Perspective, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 219, 239-43 (Emilios Avgouleas & David Donald
eds., 2019).
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reactive in genuinely embracing FinTech. This is caused by the absence
of institutional incentives to devote its resources to substituting the
existing regime with a new style of regulation. This may be because the
FSC may easily be subject to the regulatory capture, inertia, and riskaverse decision-making. Within our proposed reform framework to
regulate such FinTech-enabled services such as P2P lending in Taiwan,
in the short term, the institutional philosophy of “more principles-based”
financial regulation (“MPBR”) should be embedded in the FSC’s
mindset when implementing the FinTech Sandbox Act.
Nevertheless, we would like to direct further discussion about
government responses to FinTech towards the regulatory design of a
stronger and more independent competition authority for consumer
financial products and services. Specifically, for the long run, we would
propose a structural change in institutional design, i.e., reallocating the
authority of financial competition and innovation to a motivated
financial agency. With a professional agency that is separate from and
independent of the FSC (the sole financial regulator in Taiwan with a
predominant focus on prudential regulation), this newly created single
financial agency would be better positioned to safeguard competition
and innovation in the financial market enabled by FinTech. This more
structural change in the extant financial system and their own style of
regulation would also promote effective competition in the interests of
consumers, while providing long-term regulatory certainty for FinTechdriven financial market development.
This paper examines the business models of P2P or marketplace
lending and compares respective regulatory responses to alternative
finance options such as P2P lending across the United States, China, and
Taiwan. Next, by examining Taiwan’s change in regulatory responses,
this paper emphasizes how institutional design and incentives are likely
to play a significant role in developing the FinTech market with the
benefits of digital financial inclusion. Part I and Part II introduce
business models and regulatory frameworks of P2P lending in the
United States and China. Part III discusses potential violations of extant
financial laws and regulations in major business models of P2P lending
in Taiwan. Part IV advocates for creating an independent agency to act
separately from the FSC and to exclusively control its own rulemaking,
supervision, and enforcement of consumer financial competition
measures in Taiwan. This proposal for a more proactive and structural
approach to FinTech would help bring the issue of financial competition
and innovation to the attention of the government, so that we can further
prevent undue external influences from regualtory capture, institutional
inertia, and risk-averse decision-making by financial regulators.
Meanwhile, this body would be better suited to offer a truly independent
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perspective on competition and innovation within the financial system,
so as to refrain from driving FinTech firms away from Taiwan and
prevent them from relocating overseas due to long-term regulatory
uncertainty.
I. P2P LENDING IN THE UNITED STATES
Prosper, a P2P platform first launched in the U.S. in 2006, funded $20
million in loans within 9 months; a year later, Lending Club was
launched and became the largest U.S. P2P lending platform. Currently,
Prosper and Lending Club enjoy 98% of the U.S. market share.12 The
P2P lending industry's success can be attributed to timing. After the
global financial crisis in 2008 (“GFC”), “the resulting increase in
political scrutiny—alongside the fact that interest rates continue[d] to
remain stubbornly low—created an opportunity for peer to peer lenders
to project themselves as an accessible alternative for borrowers.”13
With U.S. P2P lending, a majority of lenders are institutional
investors (e.g., asset managers, pension funds, and hedge funds). 14
Increasingly, retail and institutional investors are separated by platforms
as institutional lenders are the only category of investors that can invest
in more risky loans. 15 Even though U.S. policy-makers offered little
support for P2P lending, partnerships between banks and P2P lending
firms have been building since the outset.16 For example, a deal between
Citi and Lending Club was announced in April 2015; bank-P2P lender
partnerships like this would supply extra funding to small and mediumsized enterprises, which would provide legitimacy to P2P lending.17
A. A Bird’s Eye View of Business Models
Instead of being an information intermediary between lenders and
borrowers or selling loans to investors wholesale, a number of U.S. P2P
12. Ed Bell, How Did P2P Lending Evolve? A Three Minute History, HARMONEY (Apr. 22,
2014), https://www.harmoney.co.nz/blog/how-did-p2p-evolve-a-three-minute-history-lesson.
13. Reema Mannah, Holding Profit Margins: Reducing the Pressures Imposed by Peer to Peer
Lending, TITLESOLV (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.titlesolv.com/hot-topics/holding-profit-marginsreducing-the-pressures-imposed-by-peer-to-peer-lending-/.
14. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 1, at 13.
15. Id.
16. The Complex Regulatory Landscape for Fintech: An Uncertain Future for Small and
Medium-Sized
Enterprise
Lending,
WORLD
ECONOMIC
FORUM
18
(2016),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Complex_Regulatory_Landscape_for_FinTech_290816.pdf.
17. Id. In contrast to the more market-driven partnership between P2P platforms and banks in the
United States, Taiwanese financial regulators in 2016 highly encouraged banks and P2P platforms to
collaborate with each other. This intervention was aimed to require the platforms to comply with
existing law and regulations applied to banks. See infra Parts III.B.1 and IV.D.
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lenders would issue notes backed by loans that are selected and funded
by the investors on P2P platforms. 18 Formally, the platform lender
retains those loans. In practice, “the credit risk is passed on to the
investor because the notes entitle the investor to payment only when
borrowers make payments on the loans.” 19 For example, as a lender
expresses interest in a potential borrower on the Lending Club platform,
with WebBank (a Utah-chartered industrial bank) lending to the
borrower, “Lending Club permanently retains ownership of the
borrower indebtedness.”20 Thereafter, Lending Club’s debt instrument or
notes are sold to the lender, “who becomes a creditor of the platform
rather than a borrower.” 21 The Lending Club platform is obliged by
these notes to “pay an amount derived from borrower payments.” 22
These transactions can be categorized under the asset securitization
model and are likely subject to federal securities law as discussed
below.23
B. The Regulatory Framework
1. The Securities Act of 1933
While Prosper requested a no-action letter after its launch in February
2006, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was not
willing to give an assurance that no action would be brought against
platform lenders for securities law violations.24 On November 24, 2008,
the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order (the “Order”) to Prosper based
upon the Supreme Court’s precedents in Howey25 and Reves,26 arguing
that those notes issued by Prosper were securities as defined in Section
2(a)(1) of the Securities Act.27 Since Prosper had not registered with the
SEC prior to the Order, the SEC determined that Prosper should register
18. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 16, at 15.
19. Id.
20. Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 UC DAVIS L. REV.
445, 476-77 (2011).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 459-60, 465. See also Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating Online
Peer-to-Peer Lending in the Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory Regime for
an Evolving Industry, 9 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485, 517 (2012) (discussing that the securitized loans
(i.e., the notes) that are sold in P2P lending transactions would be similar to the mortgage-backed
securities that are securities under federal securities law).
24. Verstein, supra note 20, at 475.
25. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-300 (1946).
26. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 56-58 (1990).
27. Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist Proceedings against Prosper Marketplace, Inc.,
Securities Act Release No. 8984, 94 SEC Docket 1913 (Nov. 24, 2008) (cease-and-desist order).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss4/5

8

Tsai: P2P Lending in U.S.A., China, & Taiwan

2019]

P2P LENDING IN U.S.A., CHINA, & TAIWAN

1085

as a public company with the SEC and “should only sell notes through a
prospectus with an effective registration statement.”28 Subsequent to the
issuance of the Order, all of the U.S. P2P platform lenders either filed
registration statements with the SEC or just folded up.29
2. GAO Report
Subsequent to the GFC, according to Section 989F(a)(1) of the
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act (the “Dodd–Frank Act”), the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) was assigned to research
and develop an “optimal Federal regulatory structure” for the P2P
lending industry.30 In July 2011, the GAO published a report to identify
two primary options for regulating P2P lending: “(1) continuing with the
current bifurcated federal system—that is, protecting lenders through
securities regulators and borrowers primarily through financial services
regulators, which will include the newly formed CFPB—or (2)
consolidating borrower and lender protection under a single federal
regulator, such as CFPB.”31 However, the GAO was incapable of giving
a complete recommendation as to which option Congress should
select.32 Whereas Prosper lobbied the U.S. House of Representatives and
the Senate to sponsor a provision under the Dodd–Frank Act that would
have made the CFPB the main regulator of P2P lending, exempting their
industry from securities regulation—the Senate refused to pass this
provision.33
3. U.S. Treasury White Paper
In May 2016, Lending Club announced CEO Renaud Laplanche’s
resignation “after an internal review found a sale of $22 million in nearprime loans to a single investor which was in violation of company
policy and the investor's ‘express instructions.’”34 Soon after, the U.S.
Treasury Department (“Treasury”) published a white paper regarding its
28. Verstein, supra note 20, at 476.
29. Id.
30. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
989F(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1947 (2010).
31. GAO-11-613, Person-to-Person Lending: New Regulatory Challenges Could Emerge as the
Industry
Grows,
U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
42
(2011),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11613.pdf. The CFPB is the acronym for the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau.
32. Verstein, supra note 20, at 523.
33. Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 23, at 526.
34. Samantha Sharf, Lending Club CEO Resigns after Internal Sale Review, FORBES (May 9,
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2016/05/09/lending-club-ceo-resigns-after-internalsale-review/#787143c570f2.
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review of the online marketplace lending industry. 35 This white paper
“establishe[d] an overview of the evolving market landscape, review[ed]
stakeholder opinions, and provide[d] policy recommendations,” while
acknowledging “the benefits and risks associated with online
marketplace lending” and highlighting “certain best practices applicable
both to established and emerging market participants.”36
In order to facilitate access to credit through the continued
development of online marketplace lending, this white paper made
recommendations to the federal government and private sector
participants to support “more robust small business borrower protections
and effective oversight”; ensure “sound borrower experience and backend operations”; promote “a transparent marketplace for borrowers and
investors”; expand “access to credit through partnerships that ensure
safe and affordable credit”; support “the expansion of safe and
affordable credit through access to government-held data”; and facilitate
“interagency coordination through the creation of a standing working
group for online marketplace lending.”37
4. OCC Guidance Paper
In March 2016, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(“OCC”) issued a paper which provides a regulatory framework for
responsible innovation, stressing “the importance of financial
institutions being receptive to technological innovation, while
emphasizing risk management and corporate governance.” 38 In
December 2016, the OCC further announced that they would charter
FinTech companies supplying bank services and products as “special

35. Opportunities and Challenges in Online Marketplace Lending, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY (2016).
36. Id. at 1.
37. Id. at 28-33.
38. Supporting Responsible Innovation in the Federal Banking System: An OCC Perspective,
OFFICE
OF
THE
COMPTROLLER
OF
THE
CURRENCY
(2016),
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-responsibleinnovation-banking-system-occ-perspective.pdf. See also Chip MacDonald, Lisa M. Ledbetter, Stephen
J. Obie, James C. Olson, Heith D. Rodman, & William M. Atherton, The OCC’s Responsible Innovation
Framework and Fintech Bank Charters—Latest Developments, JONES DAY (Jan. 2017),
http://www.jonesday.com/the-occs-responsible-innovation-framework-and-fintech-bank-charterslatestdevelopments-01-13-2017/. Under the OCC’s definition, responsible innovation means “the use of new
or improved financial products, services, and processes to meet the evolving needs of consumers,
businesses, and communities in a manner that is consistent with sound risk management and is aligned
with
the
bank’s
overall
business
strategy.”
OCC,
Responsibility
Innovation,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/index-innovation.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2018).
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purpose national banks.” 39 The announcement was followed by the
OCC’s release of a guidance paper (the “Guiding Paper”), titled
“Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech
Companies,” which offered preliminary guidance on the process of the
special purpose charter.40
From a FinTech firm’s perspective, “the most significant benefit
associated with such a charter would be that the application of many
state laws to the firm would be preempted.”41 On the other hand, since
the National Bank Act charters and governs all national banks, including
special purpose national banks, a FinTech company with such a charter
would be subject to “the provisions of the act that prescribe the bank’s
corporate organization and structure (e.g., classes of shares, voting
rights, number of directors, and term of office) and circumscribe the
activities that the bank is permitted to conduct.”42 However, even if the
OCC actually granted such FinTech charters, the type of company that
would be regarded as a FinTech company is not clear yet.43
C. Summary
The Securities Act of 1933 provides that “the offer and sale of
securities must be registered unless an exemption from registration is

39. Patrick Doyle, David F. Freeman, Jr., Brian McCormally, & Pratin Vallabhaneni, Arnold &
Porter Discusses OCC Plan to Charter FinTech Firms as Special Purpose National Banks, The CLS
Blue Sky Blog (Dec. 8, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/12/08/arnold-porter-discussesocc-plan-to-charter-fintech-firms-as-special-purpose-national-banks/.
40. OCC, Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies (2016),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/bank-operations/innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-bankcharters-for-fintech.pdf. In July 2018, the OCC officially began accepting applications for special
purpose national bank charters from “nondepository financial technology (fintech) companies engaged
in the business of banking.”
OCC, OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications
From Financial Technology Companies, https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nrocc-2018-74.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2019). Nevertheless, a federal judge recently made the FinTech
charter go into hibernation due to similar lawsuits brought by state banking regulators such as the New
York Department of Financial Services. Randall D. Guynn & Margaret
E. Tahyar, The Fintech Charter Goes into Hibernation, DAVIS POLK (May 3, 2019),
https://www.finregreform.com/single-post/2019/05/03/the-fintech-charter-goes-into-hibernation/.
41. Hilary
J.
Allen,
A
US
Regulatory
Sandbox?,
31
(2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3056993.
42. Michael Nonaka, OCC to Issue Special Purpose National Bank Charters to Fintech
Companies, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL
REGULATION (Dec. 11, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/11/occ-to-issue-specialpurpose-national-bank-charters-to-fintech-companies/.
43. The OCC only gives some examples: “marketplace lenders, payment services providers,
digital currency and distributed ledger technology companies, and financial planning and wealth
management companies.” Doyle, Freeman, McCormally, & Vallabhaneni, supra note 39.
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available.” 44 For example, Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act of 2012 added Securities Act Section 4(a)(6), offering an
exemption from registration for some crowdfunding transactions. 45
Nevertheless, under the asset securitization model, P2P lending is out of
the scope of the exemption of securities regulations. After the SEC
started to regulate P2P lending platforms via the extant securities
regulation, U.S. P2P platforms were required to sell the notes by
prospectus and file annual and quarterly reports. Perhaps because of
increased scrutiny by the SEC, P2P platforms such as Prosper and
Lending Club increased their minimum required credit scores, which
were “substantially higher than domestic microfinance institutions
require.” Paradoxically, “the SEC’s effort to regulate the industry
created barriers to entry for economically marginal and geographically
isolated borrowers.”46
Despite the fact that the GAO and U.S. Treasury used to consider
how to supervise the growing FinTech industry in a more appropriate
way, the OCC took the position in the Guidance Paper that if innovative
products or services provided by FinTech firms are tantamount to
traditional activities, like paying checks and lending money, such
companies would be allowed to receive special purpose charters. 47
Nonetheless, the OCC would charter FinTech firms and regulate them as
banks by “impos[ing] capital requirements and ask[ing] firms to submit
financial inclusion plans in the spirit of the Community Reinvestment
Act, as well as resolution plans”; however, if FinTech startups were
required to comply with this sort of regulation, they would spend too

44. Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, U.S. SECURITIES
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (2016), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide051316.htm (hereinafter Reg. CF). See also Tao Yu & Wei Shen, Funds Sharing Regulation in the
Context of the Sharing Economy: Understanding the Logic of China’s P2P Lending Regulation, 35
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 42, 53 (2019) (describing that “[t]he P2P lending regulation in the US
is a subdivision of securities regulation under which P2P lending platforms are treated as issuers by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)” whereas “the equivalent in the UK is similar to a banking
regulatory system.”).
45. See Reg. CF, supra note 44.; Chang-hsien Tsai, Legal Transplantation or Legal Innovation?
Equity Crowdfunding Regulation in Taiwan after Title III of the U.S. JOBS Act, 34 B.U. INT’L L.J. 233,
236, 240-1, 245 (2016).
46. Lisa T. Alexander, Cyberfinancing for Economic Justice, 4 WM & MARY BUS. L. REV. 309,
345 (2013).
47. Nonaka, supra note 42. See also Lalita Clozel, State Regulators Sue OCC over Fintech
Charter, American Banker (2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/state-regulators-sue-occover-fintech-charter (“For [F]in[T]ech companies, the national charter could be an opportunity to skip
the state-by-state licensing system and only deal with a single federal regulator and set of
requirements.”).
AND
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much time and money.48
II. P2P LENDING IN CHINA
It is reported that P2P lending in China has “nearly quadrupled to a
staggering $150 billion in 2015, more than ten times the size of US
marketplace lending originations.”49 At the same time, however, those
P2P platforms do not have the same restrictions as banks do, and
because they are not registered as traditional financial intermediaries,
there are substantial concerns about scandals, fraud, and other P2P
failures.50 Some commentators compare the P2P lending transactions to
“Ponzi schemes,” meaning that they “attract[] lenders through high
interest rates, and us[e] the lent funds to pay off preceding lenders.”51
The P2P lending industry in China illustrates how business models of
online P2P lending from the Western world can evolve in a different and
comparably less developed legal and regulatory environment.52 This is a
market-oriented response to the limited opportunities open to smaller
businesses for obtaining financial services from banks and to the low
returns offered to savers or investors.53 We can categorize P2P lending
in China into the following four major business models.

48. Allen, supra note 41, at 32. Similarly, as discussed below, Taiwanese financial authority, the
FSC, highly encouraged the partnership between banks and P2P platforms; their purpose is also to
govern P2P platforms via existing law and regulations applied to banks. See infra Parts III.B.1 and
IV.D.
49. Alistair Milne & Paul Parboteeah, The Business Models and Economics of Peer-to-Peer
Lending,
EUROPEAN
CREDIT
RESEARCH
INSTITUTE,
18
(May
2016),
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/ECRI%20RR17%20P2P%20Lending.pdf.
50. See Matthew Miller & Richard Borsuk, China Issues Details of Rules to Tackle Online
Financial Risk, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-financeinternet/china-issues-details-of-rules-to-tackle-online-financial-risk-idUSKCN12D0UI;
Sara
Hsu,
China’s
Poor
P2P
Lending
Models,
THE
DIPLOMAT
(Feb.
12,
2014),
https://thediplomat.com/2014/02/chinas-poor-p2p-lending-models/.
51. See Hung-Yi Chen & Chang-hsien Tsai, Changing Regulations of Peer-to-Peer Lending in
China, 36(11) BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 13, 16-17, 19-20 (2017), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3166867; Hsu, supra note 50.
52. Milne & Parboteeah, supra note 49.
53. See Robin Hui Huang, Online P2P Lending and Regulatory Responses in China:
Opportunities and Challenges, 19 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 63, 65-68 (2018); Bonnie G. Buchanan &
Cathy Xuying Cao, Quo Vadis? A Comparison of the Fintech Revolution in China and the West 19
(SWIFT Institute Working Paper No. 2017-002, 2018), https://swiftinstitute.org/research/quo-vadis-acomparison-of-the-fintech-revolution-in-china-and-the-west/ (describing “[t]here is a general shortage
of credit in China because banks prefer to lend to big SOEs.”). See also id, at 30 (taking Ezubao, “a 50
billion yuan (USD 7.6 billion) pyramid scheme established in 2014 that eventually impacted 900,000
investors in less than a two year period” as an example of a Ponzi scheme; attributing its continuing to
accelerate the growth before its collapse in 2016 to that “Chinese investors sought alternatives to the
volatile Chinese stock market and slowing real estate market”).
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A. Major Business Models
1. The Information Intermediation Model
P2P platforms in China vary considerably. In the information
intermediation model, P2P lending companies provide a platform as a
trading market to match lenders and borrowers, letting them exchange
information and make the direct trade themselves.54 Under this model,
lenders bear all credit risks derived from borrowers, and the platforms
do not provide guarantees or indemnities for borrowers’ defaults.55 For
example, Paipaidai (拍拍貸), China’s first P2P lending platform, which
was launched in 2007, introduced a bidding process to lending
projects. 56 In this model, the loan interest is determined solely by
borrowers and lenders. Meanwhile, lenders in the Paipaidai platform
bear the default risk of the borrowers without guarantees given by the
platform.57
2. The Guarantee Model
Under the guarantee model, a P2P platform not only matches lenders
and borrowers but also provides guarantees for the lender’s principal
and interests usually by cooperating with an associated guarantee
company. 58 If a loan default occurs, the platform or the guarantee
company compensates lenders and the lenders transfer the loan claims to
the platform or the guarantee company for the follow-up debt

54. Liang Shan ( 單 良 ), Jhongguodalu Wanglu Jiedai Pingtai Kuaisu Fajhan: Sihda P2P
Wangdai Moshih Fensi (中國大陸網路借貸平台快速發展：4 大 P2P 網貸模式分析) [Rapid
Development of Chinese Online Lending Platforms: An Analysis of the Four Major P2P Lending
Models], 77 TAIWAN YINHANJIA (台灣銀行家) [THE TAIWAN BANKER] 46, 47 (2016).
55. Id.
56. A loan project is successful if the total loan amount is met within a limited period of time; if
the full loan amount cannot be raised during the limited period, the loan project fails. Jing-Jie Jhang (張
靜婕) & Rong-Zong Jian (簡榮宗), P2P Daikuan Fuwu Pingtai Falu Wunti Chutan (P2P 貸款服務平
台法律問題初探) [Preliminary Study on Legal Issues of P2P Lending Platforms], www.LawTw.com (
台灣法律網),
http://www.lawtw.com/article.php?template=article_content&area=free_browse&parent_path=,1,1573,
&job_id=203436&article_category_id=2049&article_id=120368 (last visited May 6, 2018).
57. The information intermediation model is also called the “client segregated account model,”
in which “all funds from lenders and borrowers are managed by a segregated account which is separated
from the platform’s balance sheet.” Huang, supra note 53, at 70.
58. Shan, supra note 54, at 47. This model is also called the “guaranteed return model,” where
“[a]s the platform plays a similar role to that of the traditional bank, this type of online lending is said to
have ‘bank-like functions.’” Huang, supra note 52, at 71.
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collection. 59 Hongling Capital (紅岭創投), for example—one of the
earlier P2P lending platforms in China, which was launched in 2009—60
owns a guarantee company and “offers a wide range of loan products in
both secured and unsecured categories offering yields of 7-10% to
investors.” 61 Before the Chinese government started to supervise the
P2P lending industry more strictly in 2015, most P2P platforms in
China, under competitive pressure from the market, provided guarantees
for a loan’s principal and interests. 62 Those platforms, however,
specified neither the source, usage, or scale of their reserves for
guarantees, nor did they clarify whether or not the guarantees were
provided only within the cap of the reserves.63
3. The Asset Securitization Model
Within the asset securitization model the financial institutions or
other companies partition the assets, which can generate cash flow
income, and then repackage them into a standard form of securities,
creditworthiness of which is enhanced through appropriate internal or
external credits. Those securities are finally sold to investors on the
financial market, with Prosper and Lending Club as noted examples.64 In
China, some guarantee companies and microfinance firms have
established their own P2P platforms or collaborate with other P2P
lending platforms to sell the guaranteed products or microfinance assets
to the general public through the platforms.65 China’s Lufax (陸金所),
originally incubated by Pingan Insurance Group, adopts a model similar
to the asset securitization model explained above.66 Under this model,
59. See Shan, supra note 54, at 47; WANG JHIH-CHENG (王 志 誠 ) ET AL., HULIANGWANG
JINRONG JHIH JIANLI JIJHIH (互聯網金融之監理機制) [THE SUPERVISION MECHANISM OF INTERNET
FINANCE] 43-44 (2017).
60. Spencer Li, Are Chinese Platforms Abandoning the Peer-to-Peer Model?, CROWDFUND
INSIDER (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/12/78231-are-chinese-platformsabandoning-the-peer-to-peer-model/.
61. See id; TSAI-CHING LIU (劉彩卿) ET AL., JINRONG YANJIU FAZHAN JIJIN GUANLI WEIYUAN
HUI (金融研究發展基金管理委員會) [FOUNDATION OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT],
FEI YINHANGYE BANLI JINRONG YEWU ZHI GUOWAI FAZHAN QUSHI JI YINYING ZHIDAO (非銀行業辦
理金融業務之國外發展趨勢及因應之道) [FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT TREND OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
PROVIDED BY THE NON-BANK INDUSTRY AND THE SOLUTIONS] 13, 53 (2015) (hereinafter NON-BANK
INDUSTRY).
62. See Siang-Rong Ye (葉湘榕), P2P Jiedai De Moshih Fongsian Yu Jianguan Yanjiou (P2P 借
貸的模式風險與監管研究) [Research on Model Risk and Supervision of P2P Lending], 3 JINRONG
JIANGUAN YANJIOU (金融監管研究) [FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY RESEARCH] 73 (2014); Buchanan &
Cao, supra note 53, at 30.
63. Ye, supra note 62.
64. See supra Part I.A; WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 42-44.
65. Shang, supra note 54, at 47.
66. See Li, supra note 60; WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 44; Yu & Shen, supra note 44, at 49.
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special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) or trust funds are formed as
bankruptcy remote entities to isolate financial risks from the platforms,
thus protecting investors’ interests.67
4. The Debt Assignment Model
Under the debt assignment model, a lender, in cooperation with a P2P
platform, provides loans to borrowers and then sells the loan claims to
investors on the platform; this way, investors and borrowers do not
transact directly.68 CreditEase or Yixin (宜信) adopts this model to lend
money to borrowers on the platform before finding investors to channel
their funds into loans. 69 Yixin’s CEO, Ning Tang, as an individual
lender, lends his money to borrowers whose credit ratings were certified
through Yixin’s offline credit verification process. Thereafter, Yixin
splits the loans and packages them into products which investors can
buy from Tang Ning on the Yixin platform.70 Although some scholars
argue that bankruptcy remote entities such as SPVs or trust funds
differentiate the asset securitization model from the debt assignment
model,71 others maintain that these two models are actually the same.72
B. The Regulatory Framework
Following several years of rapid growth in internet finance, 73 the
Chinese government gave up its previous hands-off approach to
monitoring online financial products or services after the outbreak of
scandal, fraud, and high-profile P2P failures. In fact, in July 2015, the
Chinese government introduced its first major guidance policy on

67. WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 42-43.
68. This model is also called the “platform lender model,” “originate-to-distribute model,” or
“market place lending,” where “the platform is the one who originates loans to the borrowers . . .
proactively without the need for the matches to actually occur.” Huang, supra note 53, at 71.
69. Hsu, supra note 50.
70. WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 41. See also Hsu, supra note 50 (“Under this model, the
investors may end up lending to several borrowers, or several investors may lend to one borrower. In
some cases, loans are pooled and the debt is transferred to investors.”).
71. See supra Part II.A.3.
72. See, e.g., Wen Xiao-Bo (文曉博), P2P Zhaiquan Liuzhuan Yu Zichan Zhengquanhua De
Falu Fenxi (P2P 債權流轉與資產證券化的法律分析) [Legal Analysis of P2P claims Transfer and
Asset Securitization], 1 FAZHI YU SHEHUI (法制與社會) [LEGAL SYSTEM AND SOCIETY] 99, 100
(2015).
73. The so-called internet finance in China means “a joint product of internet and the financial
sector,” which is “more commonly referred to as Fin[T]ech in other jurisdictions.” See Huang, supra
note 53, at 64.
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internet finance as explained below.74
1. Guiding Opinions on Enhancing Positive Development of Internet
Finance
The Guiding Opinions on Enhancing Positive Development of
Internet Finance (the “Guiding Opinions”) is “a broad framework that
‘actively encourages the development of internet finance platforms’ and
is intended to ‘encourage innovation and support the steady
development of internet finance’ with ‘moderately loose regulatory
policies.’”75 Under the Guiding Opinions, P2P platforms are designated
as information intermediaries for borrowers and lenders: they shall
neither participate in the transaction, nor shall they pool or transform
financial assets in any other way. 76 According to the requirement of
establishing custodian accounts (independent from platforms) with a
“qualified banking institution,” the Guiding Opinions “appointed the
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) as [the] P2P lending
supervisory agency.” 77 Based on the overall requirements and
supervisory principles provided under the Guiding Opinions, China’s
government introduced additional regulatory measures discussed below.

74. See The Rise of Peer-to-Peer Lending in China: An Overview and Survey Case Study, THE
ASSOCIATION
OF
CHARTERED
CERTIFIED
ACCOUNTANTS
20
(2015),
http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/ACCA_Global/Technical/manage/ea-china-p2p-lending.pdf
(hereinafter Rise of Peer-to-Peer Lending); Miller & Borsuk, supra note 50. For the Chinese “zen”
approach to emerging FinTech practices by doing nothing, see Zetzsche et al., supra note 5, at 50
(“China is often applauded for adopting a laissez-faire approach before designing a comprehensive
regulatory system approach for the new environment. . . . In practice, this meant that China’s need for
regulatory sandboxes was limited, as China itself represented a sandbox on a national level.”) (footnote
omitted).
75. Rise of Peer-to-Peer Lending, supra note 74, at 20.
76. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO CAIZHENG BU ZHONGGUO RENMIN YINHANG (中國
人 民 銀 行 ) [PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA] ET AL., GUANYU CUJIN HULIANWAN JINRONG JIANKANG
FAZHAN DE ZHIDAO YIJIAN (關於促進互聯網金融健康發展的指導意見) [GUIDING OPINIONS ON
ENHANCING POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNET FINANCE] (promulgated and effective July 18, 2015)
(China) (hereinafter GUIDING OPINIONS); Rise of Peer-to-Peer Lending, supra note 74, at 20.
77. See id; Chen & Tsai, supra note 51, at 20. In March of 2018, the CBRC and China Insurance
Regulatory Commission (“CIRC”) were merged and is now be known as the China Banking and
Insurance Regulatory Commission (“CBIRC”), where the People's Bank of China (“PBOC”) “will take
over the legislative and rulemaking functions of the CBRC and CIRC, a significant increase in power,
while CBIRC . . . will play the role of policy executor.” Angelito P. Bautista Jr, China Merges Its
Banking
and
Insurance
Regulators,
THE
ASIAN
BANKER
(Apr.
25,
2018),
http://www.theasianbanker.com/updates-and-articles/china-merges-its-banking-and-insuranceregulators.
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2. Interim Measures for the Administration of the Business Activities of
Online Lending Information Intermediary Institutions
In August 2016, the CBRC issued the Interim Measures for the
Administration of the Business Activities of Online Lending
Information Intermediary Institutions (the “Interim Measures”). The
purposes of the Interim Measures are to regulate the business activities
of P2P lending, to protect the legal rights and interests of lenders,
borrowers, and platforms, to promote the sound development of the
online lending industry, and to satisfy the investment and financing
demands of small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”) and
individuals in a more effective manner. The Interim Measures reaffirm
that P2P platforms should be positioned as information intermediaries
for borrowers and lenders. 78 According to the measures, the P2P
platforms must be recorded and registered with local financial
regulatory departments after obtaining their business licenses from
company registries.79 In November 2016, the CBRC, together with the
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and State
Administration of Industry and Commerce, issued the Guidelines on the
Administration of Recordation and Registration of Online Lending
Information Intermediary Institutions (the “Registration Guidelines”).80
The Registration Guidelines reaffirm that the competent authority only
processes registration and filing of the P2P lending companies’ basic
information and does not endorse their operating capabilities,
compliance, and credit status.81
The Chinese regulatory approach may be described as relatively
flexible and hands-off in terms of the creation of online lending
platforms, aside from “cases of major risk events and outright criminal

78. See ZHONGGUO YINHANGYE JIANDU GUANLI WEIYUANHUI (中國銀行業監督管理委員會)
[CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMMISSION] ET AL., WANGLUO JIEDAI XINXI ZHONGJIE JIGOU YEWU
HUODONG GUANLI ZHANGXING BANFA (網絡借貸信息中介機構業務活動管理暫行辦法) [INTERIM
MEASURES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF ONLINE LENDING INFORMATION
INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS] (hereinafter INTERIM MEASURES) (promulgated and effective Aug. 24,
2016) (China); Chen & Tsai, supra note 51, at 20.
79. See INTERIM MEASURES § 5; Huang, supra note 53, at 73.
80. CBRC, WANGLUO JIEDAI XINXI ZHONGJIE JIGOU BEIAN DENGJI GUANLI ZHIYIN (網絡借貸
信息中介機構備案登記管理指引) [GUIDELINES FOR FILING AND REGISTRATION OF ONLINE LENDING
INFORMATION INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS], WANGDAIZHIJIA (網貸之家), http://baike.wdzj.com/docview-4284.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
81. See Huang, supra note 53, at 73 (“As the Chinese regime adopts a registration procedure
rather than an approval process, the platform can get registered as long as they provide all relevant
supporting materials.”).
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violations.”82 The Interim Measures still prefer market forces illustrated
by industry self-regulation; in fact, “regulators are more interested in
controlling undesired activities rather than setting legal barriers to entry
(e.g., a license and permit system).” 83 While the new regulatory
requirements for P2P lending providers are relatively hands-off, the
CBRC officials have foreshadowed a list of 12 forbidden activities as
red lines for the P2P lending industry.84 These 12 forbidden activities
are “the focus of the draft rules as engaging in any of these will likely
result in a complete shutdown of operations and possible prosecution by
law enforcement.”85
To name a few forbidden activities mentioned above, according to the
Interim Measures, P2P platforms shall not provide lenders with
guarantees or promise “guaranteed returns on principal and interest,” not
directly make loans to borrowers, and not structure “loans into
investment products with maturity mismatch.”86 In addition, the Interim
Measures require that P2P platforms shall not accept and manage
lenders’ funds, or build the “fund pool”; instead they must distinguish
sub-accounts for their clients and establish a third-party depository
system for customer funds with a qualified banking institution. 87 In
other words, the information intermediation model becomes the only
one that meets the aforementioned requirements, outlawing the
aforementioned debt assignment, asset securitization, and guarantee
models.88
In order to protect consumers, P2P platforms shall manage and grade
the risk tolerance levels of the lenders while controlling the loan amount
within a certain limit. 89 Moreover, platforms shall fully disclose
borrowers’ basic information, loan products, rating process, the funds
used in the unexpired loan products and other related information, while
periodically making public their financial conditions and business
82. See Spencer Li, Regulations Galore Part II: Peer to Peer Lending in China, CROWDFUND
INSIDER (Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/01/80326-regulations-galore-part-iipeer-to-peer-lending-in-china/; Huang, supra note 53, at 73. See also Buchanan & Cao, supra note 53, at
43 (noting that “[i]n the early days of the Chinese P2P market Chinese regulators had taken a hands-off
approach to regulating online consumer loans.”); Yu & Shen, supra note 44, at 49 (describing that
“[f]rom 2006 (when CreditEase, the first Chinese P2P lending company, was founded) to 2015, China’s
regulators employed a laissez faire approach towards this burgeoning and emerging industry.”).
83. See Li, supra note 82; Huang, supra note 53, at 73.
84. INTERIM MEASURES § 10.
85. Li, supra note 82.
86. INTERIM MEASURES § 10.
87. See INTERIM MEASURES § 28; Huang, supra note 53, at 74; Chen & Tsai, supra note 51, at
21.
88. See Huang, supra note 53, at 72 (underscoring that “the online lending platform cannot act as
a financial intermediary”).
89. INTERIM MEASURES §§ 17 & 26.
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operations. 90 Local regulators can scrutinize poorly rated platforms;
depending on the type of non-compliance these platforms can or cannot
be held accountable. 91 Meanwhile, local regulators should advise P2P
lending platforms on how to meet the requirements or shut down
disqualified platforms.92

3. Guidelines for Online Lending Fund Depository Business
Due to the absence of third-party supervision of P2P lending in China
in the previous years, many P2P platforms constructed fund pools,
encroaching or misappropriating customers’ funds, and even absconding
with the funds, severely damaging customers’ interests. 93 By the end of
2016, only 4% of the total number of platforms operate with the bank
depository system. 94 As both the Guiding Opinions and Interim
Measures require P2P platforms to establish a third-party depository
system for customer funds with a qualified banking institution, in
February of 2017, the CBRC further issued Guidelines for Online
Lending Fund Depository Business (the “Depository Guidelines”) to
specify the principles of fund depository business. 95 The Depository
Guidelines stipulate that customer funds and platform self-owned funds
shall be kept and managed separately, and that commercial banks as
custodians “do not provide guarantee for online lending activities and
will not be held liable for lending defaults.”96
4. Self-regulatory Rules of Information Disclosure
In October 2016, in order to meet the requirement from the Guiding
Opinions and the Interim Measures, the National Internet Finance
Association of China (the “NIFAC”)—organized by the People’s Bank
of China (“PBOC”) along with related regulatory agencies—issued selfregulations for information disclosure (the “Self-Regulations”) to
90. INTERIM MEASURES §§30-32. For detailed introduction to information disclosure, see Huang,
supra note 53, at 75-76; Chen & Tsai, supra note 51, at 21.
91. Li, supra note 82.
92. INTERIM MEASURES §44.
93. CBRC, WANGLUO JIEDAI ZIJIN CUNGUAN YEWU ZHIYIN DA JIZHE WEN (網絡借貸資金存
管業務指引答記者問) [ANSWERS TO JOURNALISTS’ QUESTIONS ON GUIDELINES FOR ONLINE LENDING
FUND DEPOSITORY BUSINESS] (2017),
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/A5A5F5AB66FA4E74A9988D07C79B7BCB.html
(last visited July 12, 2018).
94. Id.
95. CBRC, WANGLUO JIEDAI ZIJIN CUNGUAN YEWU ZHIYIN (網絡借貸資金存管業務指引)
[GUIDELINES FOR ONLINE LENDING FUND DEPOSITORY BUSINESS] (promulgated and effective Feb. 22,
2017) (China).
96. See Huang, supra note 53, at 74-75.
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increase information transparency and enable the investing public to
jointly monitor and prevent fraud or moral hazard. 97 The SelfRegulations propose 96 disclosure indicators, including 65 mandatory
indicators and 31 encouraged indicators.98 The Self-Regulations divide
the indicators into three types of information: institutional information,
operational information, and information on loan projects. 99 The
information disclosure obligations vary with the scale of platforms. 100
That is, larger platforms with more risks bear higher disclosure
obligations. The NIFAC has set a threshold in the application process
for membership, which requires the platform to disclose the information
for more than three months according to the Self-Regulations.101 If false
or fraudulent information is disclosed, the platform becomes ineligible
for membership within two years of such disclosure.102
C. Summary
The business models of P2P lending in China are diverse, and each
model may come with different kinds or levels of risks. For instance,
“[c]redit risk is compounded in cases where the principal has been
guaranteed, and P2P lenders may rapidly face a crisis of liquidity or

97. GUIDING OPINIONS §19; INTERIM MEASURES §34. The NIFAC, as a semi-private regulator,
was established in December 2015 for regulating the internet finance industry, which includes P2P
lending, under its self-regulatory rules. Chen & Tsai, supra note 51, at 21.
98. ZHONGGUO HULIANGWANG JINRONG XIEHUI (中國互聯網金融協會) [NATIONAL INTERNET
FINANCE ASSOCIATION OF CHINA], Zhongguo Huliangwang Jinrong Xiehui Huliangwang Jinrong Xinxi
Pilu Zilu Guanli Guifan (中國互聯網金融協會互聯網金融信息披露自律管理規範 [NIFAC Rule on
Self-Regulation of Information Disclosure], Wang Dai Zhi Jia ( 網 貸 之 家 ) [Wangdaizhijia],
http://www.wdzj.com/zhuanti/xpbz/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2018) (hereinafter Self-Regulations).
ZHONGGUO HULIANGWANG JINRONG XIEHUI (中國互聯網金融協會) [NATIONAL INTERNET FINANCE
ASSOCIATION OF CHINA], Hu Liang Wang Jin Rong Xin Xi Pi Lu Biao Zhun: P2P Wang Dai (互聯網金
融信息披露標準：P2P 網貸) [Standard on Internet Financial Information Disclosure for Online
Lending], Wang Dai Zhi Jia (網貸之家) [Wangdaizhijia], http://www.wdzj.com/zhuanti/xpbz/ (last
visited Apr. 23, 2018) (hereinafter Standards). To more officially list in detail the disclosure
requirements the P2P lending platforms should obey, CBRC promulgated the “Disclosure Guidelines”
in August of 2017. CBRC, WANGLUO JIEDAI XINXI ZHONGJIE JIGOU YEWU HUODONG XINXI PILU
ZHIYIN (網絡借貸信息中介機構業務活動信息披露指引) [GUIDELINES FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF
INFORMATION ON THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF ONLINE LENDING INFORMATION INTERMEDIARY
INSTITUTIONS] (promulgated and effective Aug. 23, 2017) (China). Therefore, commentators indicate
that the “existing Chinese regulations constitute a “One + Three” regulatory system for the P2P lending
industry”, that the “One” is the “Interim Measures” of 2016, and that the “Three” refers to the
“Registration Guidelines” of 2016, the “Depository Guidelines” of 2017, and the “Disclosure
Guidelines” of 2017. Yu & Shen, supra note 44, at 50-52.
99. See Standards, supra note 98. For detailed examples of these three types, see Huang, supra
note 53, at 76.
100. See Standards, supra note 98.
101. Self-Regulations, supra note 98, §2.
102. Self-Regulations, supra note 98, §27.
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solvency when borrowers become delinquent.”103 In addition, under the
asset securitization and debt assignment models, “the investors may end
up lending to several borrowers, or several investors may lend to one
borrower. In some cases, loans are pooled and the debt is transferred to
investors.” 104 In these cases, the P2P lending company has additional
responsibility to ensure the credibility of borrowers. 105
Given the rapid development of internet finance, the Chinese
regulators initially were more interested in cracking down on undesired
activities, rather than imposing legal barriers to entry such as a licensure
regime. 106 A list of 12 forbidden activities in the Interim Measures
represents the primary focus of the regulators, for the purposes to
“promote risk management and establish much-needed ground rules to
limit the prevalence of unsound practices and illegal activity in the
industry.” 107 Industry self-regulation is touted in the document as the
ideal approach.108 Since the Chinese government made it clear that “P2P
platforms should be positioned as information intermediaries” only,
“mainstream P2P products have been standardized to the extent that they
are defined as assets reflecting actual lending relationship.” 109
Accordingly, as both the Guiding Opinions and the Interim Measures
emphasize that P2P lending companies shall act as information
intermediaries, P2P platforms can only adopt the information
intermediation model. However, it may be disputed that other models,
not least the asset securitization and debt assignment models, should be
completely forbidden simply because they imply more potential risks.
Though others may suggest that, in the meantime, the competent
authorities should, to an extent, allow these models with the premises of
appropriate supervision in terms of containing potential systemic risk
103. Hsu, supra note 50.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Li, supra note 82.
107. Id.
108. Id. Nevertheless, a large number of P2P lending platforms in China collapsed in June and
July of 2018, causing many defaults. Chen Jia, Regulator to Clamp Down on P2P Loans, Stock as
Collateral,
CHINA
DAILY
(Aug.
28,
2018),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/28/WS5b849353a310add14f388102.html. Thus, it is expected
that China’s financial regulators would further tighten regulation on internet finance; for example, new
regulations were announced in August 2018, requiring that local governments “set up ‘communications
windows’ where investors can complain, that “[n]ew P2P companies and platforms are strictly banned”,
and that “[t]hose that do not repay their loans will be blacklisted under China’s social-credit rating
system.” Amanda Erickson, Chinese Anger Grows As ‘Get Rich Quick’ Investment Schemes Go Bust,
THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chineseanger-grows-as-get-rich-quick-investment-schemes-go-bust/2018/08/29/4a1cd5a2-a45b-11e8-b76bd513a40042f6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d98647e2779a.
109. P2P Lending Market in China, BOAO REVIEW & LUFAX.COM 14, http://blog.lendit.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/Lufax-white-paper-Chinese-P2P-Market.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2018).
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and protecting consumer interest. Next, we will examine P2P lending in
Taiwan, laying foundation for a comparison among the United States,
China, and Taiwan regarding regulatory responses to P2P lending, in
particular, and FinTech, in general.110
III. P2P LENDING IN TAIWAN
P2P lending in Taiwan developed quite a while later than in the
United States and China. One reason for this is that financial institutions
in Taiwan did not experience tightened monetary conditions nor did they
feel the credit crunch; therefore, financial consumers did not face the
urgent need to find alternative financing channels after the GFC in
2008. 111 Also, individuals in Taiwan perceive savings and personal
credit differently than those in Europe and the United States. In Taiwan,
most people with saving habits have less demand for short-term
microfinance (such as tuition fees, housing repairs, and travel funds),
and people with funds are less willing to lend money to others without
trust and full information.112 In addition, Taiwanese financial regulations
have always been formulated in a positive-list approach, meaning that
only financial products or services that have been evaluated and
approved by competent authorities would be permitted in trade. 113
Therefore, without specific applicable regulations, Taiwan’s P2P
platforms remain on the sidelines or underground, fearing the potential
violations of laws and regulations and the following legal
enforcement.114
The FSC, the sole watchdog for the whole financial market in
Taiwan, has said that, in spite of the widespread advanced internet
technology, the financial market in Taiwan is relatively smaller than in
the United States and China; therefore, competition between financial

110. See infra Part IV.A.
111. According to the statistics from the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan), the loan
balances of major banking institutions have grown year by year; despite experiencing the GFC in 2008,
the annual growth rate of loans and investments still increased. NON-BANK INDUSTRY, supra note 61, at
64-66.
112. Id. at 77.
113. Gu Xiang-Yi (谷湘儀) & Xu Ying-Shu (徐瑩書), P2P Wanglu Jiedai Pingtai Zhi Falu
Wenti (P2P 網路借貸平臺之法律問題) [Legal Issues of P2P Lending Platforms], in CAIJIN FA: XIN
SHANGZHAN JIYUAN (財經法：新商戰紀元) [FINANCIAL LAW: NEW BUSINESS WAR ERA] 209, 220-21
(LCS & Partners eds., 2016).
114. Id.
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institutions in Taiwan is highly intense. 115 The FSC also states that
Taiwanese financial institutions such as banks, credit unions, and credit
departments in local farmers’ and fishermen’s associations provide
ample capital and various types of loan projects to meet diverse
financing needs for individuals and SMEs at reasonable interest rates.116
With concerns about current circumstances of over-banking, the FSC
hesitated to decide whether to formally authorize the P2P lending
industry in Taiwan.117
On the other hand, not all borrowers are satisfied with services
provided by traditional financial institutions; even though there are
many banks in Taiwan, financial products introduced by banks are quite
similar. 118 Since the banks’ loan approval standards are too strict for
many borrowers, those who fail to meet these high standards can only
borrow money from the underground financial market.119 SMEs, online
micro businesses, and start-ups in culture and creativity industries
emerging in recent years find it difficult to evaluate their output value in
their infancy and, in turn, find it difficult to get loans from traditional
banks.120 Such entrepreneurs may address their financing demands via
alternative financing channels, e.g., P2P lending platforms. Specifically,
recent research reports state that “[a]cross the period 2013-2016 the
average annual growth rate for the alternative finance industry in
Taiwan was close to 200%”; thus, “peer-to-peer business lending was by
far the leading alternative finance model with $42.5 million raised in

115. See Zhen-Ling Peng (彭禎伶), Kaifang P2P Jinrong Zeng Min-Zong: Fengxian Xu Zifu (開
放 P2P 金融 曾銘宗：風險須自負) [If P2P Finance Liberalized, Consumers Should Be at Their Own
Risk, Zeng Min-Zong Said.], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO ( 中 國 時 報 ) [CHINA TIMES] (July 17, 2015),
http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20150717000044-260202; Bing-Hang Fan ( 范 秉 航 ), Cong
Dianfushi De Chuangxin Kan Shuwei Jinrong Langchao Xia De Taiwan (從顛覆式的創新，看數位金
融浪潮下的台灣) [Look at Taiwan on the Digital Financial Waves from the Perspective of Disruptive
Innovation], TAIWAN JINGJI YANJIU YUAN (台灣經濟研究院) [TAIWAN INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH] (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.tier.org.tw/comment/pec5010.aspx?GUID=bb31ae61-a3f144a6-9353-5d6ff25c9288.
116. JINRONG JIANDU GUANLI WEIYUAN HUI (金融監督管理委員會) [FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY
COMMISSION R.O.C.], JIN RONG KE JI FA ZHAN CE LUE BAIPI SHU (金融科技發展策略白皮書)
[FINTECH DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY WHITE PAPER] 26 (2016) (Taiwan) (hereinafter WHITE PAPER).
117. See Peng, supra note 115; Fan, supra note 115.
118. Huang Qi-Xiu (黃麒修), Con Luo Ji Tui Lun Kan Tai Wan FinTech Chan Ye Fa Zhan (從邏
輯推論看台灣 FinTech 產業發展) [A Perspective of Logic on FinTech Industrial Development in
Taiwan], TAIWAN ZIJIN JIAOYI SUO (台灣資金交易所) [TAIWAN FUND EXCHANGE] (May 2, 2017),
http://blog.taiwanfundexchange.com.tw/?p=726.
119. Id.
120. NON-BANK INDUSTRY, supra note 61, at 78-79.
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2016.”121
A. Business Models Exemplified
In May 2016, the FSC released the FinTech Development Strategy
White Paper (the “White Paper”) with aims to help “innovate the digital
technology and create . . . smart finance.”122 The White Paper states that
P2P lending provides a direct lending intermediary where the process of
private lending or retail finance market is quickly facilitated, and that in
the meantime, through Big Data analysis, P2P platforms have
established a forecasting mechanism to detect the credit risks earlier and
address them effectively.123 What P2P lending companies do—matching
both parties in private lending contracts—falls outside the definition of
any financial business requiring ex ante authorization from the FSC
under Taiwanese financial laws.124 The aforementioned statement may
suggest that P2P lending would (or should) merely act as an information
intermediary in the FSC’s mindset. Next, we examine business models
of current P2P lending companies operating in Taiwan.
1. The Information Intermediation Model
Platforms that adopt the information intermediation model are
information intermediaries that match lenders and borrowers, and do not
arrange loans or get repayments from both sides. Lending parties make
loans through banks or licensed third-party payment institutions. Lend &
Borrow (“LnB”) offers an example to illustrate that borrowers first
signal their loan demands and disclose their credit information for
reviewing by the platform; thereafter, the platform assesses the loan
interest rate and posts the loan application to the website for lenders to
shop.125 After creating a lending contract, lenders and borrowers would
be notified of bank account numbers of their counterparties, which have
been verified by the platform for loan making and repayment. 126
Nevertheless, even if LnB is not involved in the cash flow between
121. Yunyu Chengchang: Dier Ci Yatai Dicyu Wanglu Tidai Jinrong Hangye Baogao (孕育成長
：第二期亞太地區網路替代金融行業報告 ) [Cultivating Growth: The 2nd Asia Pacific Region
Alternative Finance Industry Report], JIANQIAO DAXUE XINXING JINRONG YANJIU ZONGXIN (劍橋大學
新 興 金 融 研 究 中 心 ) [CAMBRIDGE CENTRE FOR ALTERNATIVE FINANCE], 66 (2017) (hereinafter
Cultivating Growth).
122. WHITE PAPER, supra note 116, at 1.
123. Id. at 25.
124. Id. at 26.
125. XINYONG SHIJI (信用市集) [Lend & Borrower], LnB Yunzuo Moshi (LnB 運作模式) [How
LnB Works], https://www.lnb.com.tw/how-it-works.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
126. Id.
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lenders and borrowers, providing guarantees for at least 70% of a loan’s
principal is part of LnB’s business model. 127 Under its model, LnB
provides guarantees for the lender’s principal to a large extent by
creating a trust of “guaranteed returns on principal.” When the loan
default occurs, the platform compensates lenders with the reserve from
the trust, and lenders transfer the loan claims to the platform or the
associated asset management company for subsequent debt collection.128
2. The Debt Assignment Model
Some of the P2P platforms in Taiwan seem to adopt the debt
assignment model, where borrowers receive loans from lenders who
then sell the loans to investors through the platform, such as
Siangmindai.129 Taiwan’s debt assignment model, however, is different
from its counterpart in China.130 Specifically, Siangmindai does not lend
money to borrowers in the name of the chief executive of the P2P
lending company in the first place; it also does not divide the loans and
package them into products that investors can buy on the platform.
Instead, “advanced” members on the platform as lenders satisfy
borrowers’ loan demands in full, and may choose to hold the loans until
the expiry dates or, earlier, split and sell loan claims to the “general”
members on the platform.131 The platform itself is not involved in the
cash flow of lending activities.132
B. Legal Issues
1. The Regulatory Background
Due to the lack of customized regulations applicable to P2P lending,
the FSC can only remind investors of the potential investment risks on
P2P lending platforms, require those platforms to play a role of mere
information intermediaries that match borrowers and lenders in a private
lending contractual relationship under the Civil Code, and closely
monitor those platforms to determine whether they cross red lines drawn

127. WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 54, 60. In this sense, LnB’s business model is similar to the
guarantee model in China. See Part II.A.2.
128. XIANG-YI (GRACE) GU (谷湘儀) ET AL., JIN RONG KE JI FA ZHAN YU FU LU (金融科技發展
與法律) [THE FINTECH DEVELOPMENT AND THE LAW] 161, 163 (2017).
129. SIANGMINDAI ( 鄉 民 貸 ), Yunzuo Fangshi ( 運 作 方 式 ) [How It Works],
https://www.lend.com.tw/work.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
130. See Part II.A.4.
131. WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 54, 57-58; GU ET AL., supra note 128, at 161-62.
132. See SIANGMINDAI, supra note 129.
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under the Security and Exchange Act (“SEA”), the Banking Act, the Act
Governing Electronic Payment Institutions (the “EPI Act”), 133 and the
Financial Asset Securitization Act (the “FASA”).134 The FSC evaluated
regulatory approaches to the P2P lending sector in May 2016, including
enacting a specified act or amending the EPI Act to govern this sector.135
However, officials finally decided that no statutes would be enacted or
amended since P2P lending was characterized as pure private lending.
Meanwhile, the FSC highly encouraged banks and P2P platforms to
collaborate with each other, with a view to strengthening internal
controls of those platforms and, in turn, lowering operational risks.136
2. The Information Intermediation Model
As mentioned above, under the information intermediation model, a
loan contract is signed by both lenders and borrowers, and the platform
does not intervene in the cash flow. All platforms would (or should) do
is match borrowers and lenders, instead of accepting deposits, because
such banking activities as accepting deposits shall be licensed by the
financial authority in advance. 137 Therefore, P2P platforms function
merely as brokers—a role that is governed under the Civil Code and its
case law.138 For example, Taiwan’s Civil Code stipulates that the loan
interest rate shall not exceed 20 percent per annum. 139 In addition,
133. Aiming to encourage the development of online financial innovations, the EPI Act was
enacted in February 2015 to regulate online stored payments by non-banks after almost two years of
discussions and debates between the financial authority and platforms. This EPI Act is known as the
third-party payment law in Taiwan, providing a thorough legal basis for electronic payment services to
be provided by third-party intermediaries on the internet.
134. WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 212-14.
135. Cultivating Growth, supra note 121, at 68.
136. See id; Press Release, Fin. Supervisory Commission, Jin Guan Hui Bei Cha Yin Hang Yu
Wang Lu Jie Dai Ping Tai Ye Zhe He Zuo Zi Lu Gui Fan [Financial Supervisory Commission Files for
Future Reference Self-Regulatory Rules on Collaboration between Banks and P2P Lending Platforms]
(Dec.
7,
2017),
https://www.fsc.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=96&parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=news_view.jsp&dataserno=2
01712070001&aplistdn=ou=news,ou=multisite,ou=chinese,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtable=News
(noting that the FSC adopts the regulatory approach to P2P lending of “encouraging” collaboration
between banks and P2P lending platforms by directing Taiwan’s Bankers Association to write their selfregulatory rules, while requiring P2P platforms not to cross red lines drawn under existing laws such as
the SEA, the Banking Act, the EPI Act, and the FASA). When it comes to regulatory approaches to P2P
lending, “[t]he regulation of P2P lending in the US is a security-based system while the equivalent in the
UK is similar to a banking regulatory system.” Yu & Shen, supra note 44, at 53. The FSC’s “four-redline” approach is arguably a combination of securities and banking regulatory models, as the SEA and
the FASA are under the securities regulation while the Banking Act and the EPI Act are part of the
banking regime.
137. Gu & Xu, supra note 113, at 226-28.
138. Id.
139. Minfa (民法 ) [Civil Code] §205 (promulgated Nov. 22, 1929, effective May 5, 1930)
(Taiwan).
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platforms shall accurately report the contractual matters of the proposed
transaction to each party insofar as they know these matters, while not
acting as an intermediary for a person who is notoriously insolvent or
who does not have capacity to enter into the proposed contract.140 Also,
the platform has investigative duties regarding the contractual matters of
the proposed transaction and the solvency or capacity of each party to
enter into the proposed contract. 141 On the other hand, in the case of
LnB, as it provides guarantees for lenders’ principal to a large extent, it
is uncertain whether it still acts as a pure information intermediary. 142
3. The Debt Assignment Model
a. Illegal Deposit Accepting
Due to the financial vulnerability and externality inherent in the
banking business operated by financial intermediaries, bank runs or
bankruptcies are likely to impact the stability of the overall financial
system.143 As banks accept deposits from the general public and then
lend the money to borrowers, their business model is highly financially
leveraged where the banks do not own ample private funds. 144
Therefore, banking services are always regulated by the competent
authorities prudentially. 145 As for the supervision of financial
institutions, the competent authority usually adopts a licensure regime;
only those regulated under banking law are authorized to accept
deposits.146 In light of the fact that accepting deposits is a bank’s core
business and may have a wide range of impacts, in order to protect
depositors’ interests, Taiwan’s Banking Act expressly restricts that,
unless otherwise provided by law, any institutions other than banks shall
not accept deposits. 147 If P2P platforms undertake fund pooling to
control the funds solicited from lenders, then it will no longer be merely

140. Minfa (民法) [Civil Code] §567, para. 1 (promulgated Nov. 22, 1929, effective May 5, 1930,
as amended Apr. 21, 1999) (Taiwan).
141. Minfa (民法) [Civil Code] §567, para. 2 (promulgated Nov. 22, 1929, effective May 5, 1930,
as amended Apr. 21, 1999) (Taiwan).
142. See GU ET AL., supra note 128, at 170-71; Gu & Xu, supra note 113, at 231.
143. Jun-Yan Jiang (江俊彥), Weifa Xijin Anjian Xingshi Guifan Zhi Yanjiu (違法吸金案件刑事
規範之研究：以銀行法與證交法間之體系違反為中心) [Study on Unauthorized Fund-Raising:
Focusing on the Conflict between Banking Act and Securities and Exchange Act], 230 FAXUE CONGKAN
(法學叢刊) [LAW JOURNAL] 133, 147 (2013).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. GU ET AL., supra note 128, at 165.
147. YinHang Fa (銀行法) [Banking Act] §29-1 (promulgated and effective July 17, 1989)
(Taiwan).
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an information intermediary that matches lenders and borrowers;
instead, it would be an institution that collects deposits from the general
public, which may violate Articles 5-1, 29, 29-1, and 125 of the Banking
Act.148
Under the debt assignment model in China,149 a few P2P platforms
such as Hongling Capital “developed a secondary market dedicated to
their own products in a bid to increase product or debt liquidity,
allowing creditors owning outstanding loans to trade remaining debts
publicly for early investment recovery.” 150 In Taiwan, if funds are
provided to borrowers through an associated or cooperative entity such
as banks or third-party payment institutions on a P2P platform, the
matching business may not be deemed the business exclusively
permitted for banks, which shall be ex ante authorized by the competent
authority. 151 Nevertheless, in the case of the debt assignment model
illustrated by Siangmindai in Taiwan, 152 a question remains: even
though lenders and borrowers are required to register with the platform
to be a member for subsequent trades and only if a loan contract is
entered into will funds be provided, would its business model fall within
the element of “the general public” stipulated under Articles 5-1 and 291 of the Banking Act? According to Taiwan’s Supreme Court, whenever
persons approached to solicit funds are not specified and the number of
people may increase anytime, even though a portion of the persons
coincidentally have qualifications, this may constitute a criminal breach
under Article 125 of the Banking Act, i.e., the offense of illegal fund
solicitation.153
b. Illegal Fund Raising
Taiwan’s SEA provides that, except for government bonds or other
148. See Gu & Xu, supra note 113, at 226-27.
149. See Part II.A.4.
150. BOAO REVIEW & LUFAX.COM, supra note 109, at 14.
151. GU ET AL., supra note 128, at 166. The FSC warned in 2016 that the intermediation services
provided by P2P lending platforms should not involve taking funds from the general public indirectly or
directly such that their undertakings have anything to do with “accepting deposits” under the Banking
Act and “accepting deposits of funds as stored value funds” under the EPI Act. See Press Release, Fin.
Supervisory Commission, Jin Guan Hui Dui Yu Guo Nei Wang Lu Jie Dai Ping Tai Fa Zhan Xian
Kuang Zhi Shuo Ming [FSC on the Current Development of Online Lending Platforms in Taiwan] (Apr.
14,
2016),
https://www.fsc.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=96&parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=news_view.jsp&dataserno=2
01604140004&aplistdn=ou=news,ou=multisite,ou=chinese,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtable=News
(hereinafter “Online Lending Platforms”); WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 213-14.
152. See Part III.A.2.
153. See Zuigao Fayuan (最高法院) [Supreme Court], Xingshi (刑事) [Criminal Division], 104
Tai Shang Zi No. 417 (104 台上字第 417 號刑事判決) (2015) (Taiwan); GU ET AL., supra note 128, at
166.
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securities exempted by the Competent Authority, the public offering or
issuing of securities shall be prohibited without an effective registration
with the Competent Authority. 154 In applying for approval to publicly
offer and issue securities, the issuer is required to submit a prospectus.155
P2P platforms that convert a loan into an investment vehicle without
permission from the Competent Authority may violate the
aforementioned requirements under Taiwan’s SEA.156
The SEC has declared that notes backed by loans that are selected and
funded by investors on P2P platforms are deemed investment contracts
and shall, thus, be regulated under the Securities Act. 157 Nonetheless,
Taiwan’s SEA enumerates all the regulated securities, albeit such
securities do not include the promissory note issued by P2P platforms.
The Ministry of Finance in Taiwan (the predecessor of the FSC) used to
classify the following as SEA-governed securities—foreign investmentoriented securities and investment contracts into which overseas Chinese
or foreigners enter to raise funds from local investors in Taiwan for
outward investment in foreign jurisdictions; these regulatory practices
do not clarify whether investment contracts are securities governed
under the SEA.158 If Taiwan’s P2P platforms under the debt assignment
model divide a loan into several sub-units and then issue similar notes to
investors after they purchase any sub-unit of the loan, this business
model will look like the U.S. P2P lending model of asset securitization
before the SEC issued the Order in 2008, requiring Prosper to sell notes
through a prospectus with an effective registration statement.159 In this
regard, the FSC issued a press release in 2016, warning that matching
business conducted on P2P platforms cannot involve “publicly issuing
securities” under SEA and “publicly issuing Beneficial Securities or
Asset-Backed Securities” under the FASA. Thus, if the notes issued
under the debt assignment model or even under the asset securitization
model, just as in the form of payment dependent notes issued by
Lending Club and Prosper in the United States, P2P lending companies
in Taiwan may be criminally liable under Articles 22 and 174 of the

154. Zhengquan Jiaoyi Fa (證券交易法) [Securities and Exchange Act] §22 para. 1 (promulgated
and effective Apr. 30, 1968, as amended Jan. 11, 2006).
155. Zhengquan Jiaoyi Fa (證券交易法) [Securities and Exchange Act] §30 para. 1 (promulgated
and effective Apr. 30, 1968, as amended June 12, 2002).
156. Jiang, supra note 143, at 153-54.
157. See supra Part I.B.1.
158. See ZHONGHUA MINGUO CAIZHENG BU (中華民國財政部) [MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF
R.O.C.], Sept. 12, 1987 Tai Cai Zheng (2) Zi Di 00900 Hao Gonggao (76 年 9 月 12 日臺財證（二）
字第 900 號公告) (1987); Sept. 18, 1987 Tai Cai Zheng (2) Zi Di 6805 Hao Han (76 年 9 月 18 日臺財
證（二）字第 6805 號函) (1987); Oct. 30, 1987 Tai Cai Zheng (2) Zi Di 6934 Hao Gonggao (76 年 10
月 30 日臺財證（二）字第 6934 號公告) (1987); Jiang, supra note 143, at 153.
159. See supra Parts I.A & B.1.
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SEA or Articles 73 and 108 of the FASA.160
C. Summary
As discussed above, some business models of P2P lending in Taiwan
may violate the Banking Act, EPI Act, FASA, or SEA. However,
whether requiring P2P platforms to register with the FSC in their
infancy (hence bearing strict information disclosure obligations under
the SEA or FASA), or requiring those platforms to apply for a
bank/Electronic Payment Institution license under the Banking/EPI Act
may significantly increase the cost to newly-established P2P platforms,
hindering the concomitant financial innovation and inclusion. We may
learn a lesson from the U.S. regulatory response to P2P lending. After
the SEC tightened regulations of the P2P lending industry, P2P
platforms such as Lending Club and Prosper raised the required
threshold of borrowers’ credit scores substantially; that way, P2P
lending would essentially be unable to meet the loan demands of
individuals or SMEs who have difficulties obtaining funds from the
traditional financial institutions.161
Even if Taiwanese P2P lending platforms are required to act merely
as an information intermediary, it can use information technology to
review borrowers’ credit and set loan interest rates in a more efficient
way than traditional financial intermediaries do. 162 Lenders can
subsequently rely on the credit scores provided and interest rates set by
the platforms to select their lending projects. If this emerging credit
assessment mechanism fails to enter the market, it would harm lenders’
interests and those of economically marginal borrowers, compromising
digital financial inclusion. Therefore, government responses to business
models of P2P lending in particular, and to FinTech in general, would be
the key.163 From a broader perspective, during the early development of
such innovative FinTech-enabled financial services as P2P lending, in
order to prevent the FinTech industry from excessive exposure to legal
risks due to regulatory uncertainty of business models, it is necessary to
establish a flexible and proportionate regulatory regime where regulators
and the regulated can collaborate, carry on a dialogue, and experiment

160. See Online Lending Platforms, supra note 151; WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 213.
161. See supra Part I.C.
162. See, e.g., Berg et al., supra note 4, at 7 (indicating that “[a] credit score based on the digital
footprint should therefore serve as a benchmark for other models that use more elaborate sources of
information that might either be more costly to collect or only accessible to a selected group of
intermediaries”).
163. For comparing regulatory responses to P2P lending among the United States, China, and
Taiwan, see infra Part IV.A.
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with what would be more appropriate regulatory approaches. 164 In
addition to the regulatory sandbox discussed below, 165 we could
consider moving consumer financial competition into a separate and
single agency for a more structural change in the extant financial
regulation; that way prudential regulation concerns would not dominate
over consumer financial competition sparked by FinTech innovations
such as P2P lending.166 This regulatory proposal is intended to focus the
mission of consumer financial competition and innovation, including
rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement, in the hands of a single
professional agency, who would be at the same hierarchical level as the
FSC, while simultaneously independent of it. Accordingly, a stronger
and independent body exclusive for consumer financial competition and
innovation could be best placed to foster healthy market competition
among traditional financial institutions and FinTech firms that provide
digital financial inclusion.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF FINTECH REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN TAIWAN:
P2P LENDING AS AN EXAMPLE
A. A Comparison of Regulatory Responses to P2P Lending
As a commentator argues, to address the current issue that financial
services remain expensive and inefficient, rather than a top-down
structural change in regulation of incumbents that is subject to
prohibitively high costs of political economy and coordination,
“regulators should consider policies that promote low-leverage
technologies and the entry of new firms.” 167 The current financial
system might also be troubled by incumbents’ regulatory capture,
creating entry barriers to new competitors. 168 When it comes to
164. For detailed discussion on the spirit of MPBR, see infra Part IV.B.
165. See infra Part IV.C.
166. See infra Part IV.D.
167. Thomas Philippon, The FinTech Opportunity 1, 2–3, 9, 18 (NBER Working Paper No.
22476, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22476.
168. See id. at 16 (“FinTech firms will enter where they think they can make a profit, but there are
many regions of the financial system where incumbents are entrenched and entry is difficult.”). See also
Abraham J.B. Cable, Institutionalized Disruption: The Rise of the Reformer Startup, 12 HASTINGS BUS.
L. J. 1, 12 (2015) (“[R]eformer startups represent the public interest. The success of their products
exposes current regulation as wrongheaded. Reformer startups and their grassroots advocates educate, or
expose, regulators and lawmakers who would otherwise be hopelessly anachronistic or beholden to
incumbents.”). To illustrate the regulatory capture problem in regulating the P2P lending industry,
commentators contend that [i]t is the Chinese commercial banks that called for heavy regulation towards
P2P lending”, that “[t]hese big players have tried to maintain their monopolistic position in financial
markets”, and that [r]egulators and legislators are likely to be influenced by lob-bying efforts due to
information asymmetry.” Yu & Shen, supra note 44, at 56 (footnote omitted).
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regulatory responses to Fintech startups, scholars examining the
likelihood of promoting much structural change distinguish between two
broad categories of change—“reactive” and “proactive”—as described
below.169
Reactive. The first group includes countries in which nothing is
being done. There is No Regulatory Talk or Action. The second
group consists of countries in which there is partial or Fragmented
Regulation of Fin[T]ech. Certain institutions, such as the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in the United
States, may offer certain safe harbor provisions for certain type of
Fin[T]ech companies. Yet there appears little willingness to
genuinely embrace the technology and its regulatory implications,
nor is there any comprehensive plan as to how Fin[T]ech can or
should be regulated.
Proactive. In such countries, there is a significant amount of
regulatory attention paid to Fin[T]ech. Such attention can take the
form of consultation papers, White Papers, or conferences. But
action is limited and there is a risk that prioritizing Fin[T]ech can
slide into an empty lip service aimed at projecting an image of
regulatory action when, in reality, action is limited. . . . A second
group of countries engage in what might be characterized as
Regulatory Guidance. . . . A final group of countries have
embraced the possibilities of Fin[T]ech by creating a so-called
regulatory sandbox.170

169. Mark Fenwick et al., Fintech and the Financing of Entrepreneurs: From Crowdfunding to
Marketplace Lending, in THE ECONOMICS OF CROWDFUNDING: STARTUPS, PORTALS AND INVESTOR
BEHAVIOR 103, 108 (Douglas Cumming & Lars Hornuf eds., 2018).
170. Id. at 119. In terms of “reactive” regulatory responses, as FinTech is also a type of
technology, “[t]he regulation of any disruptive new technology is always going to be reactive and based
on an uncertain and politicized factual basis.” Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, & Erik P.M. Vermeulen,
Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens When Technology Is Faster than the Law?, 6 AM. U. BUS. L.
REV. 561, 574 (2017). Traditional regulation is characterized by a slow, deliberative, reactive, and
sometimes even cumbersome process in response. See Alice Armitage, Andrew K. Cordova, & Rebecca
Siegel, Design Thinking: The Answer to the Impasse Between Innovation and Regulation, 2 GEO. L.
TECH. REV. 3, 13, 14, 25, 65 (2017). On the contrary, when it comes to “proactive” regulatory responses,
some commentators normatively argue that “[l]awmaking and regulatory design needs to become more
proactive, dynamic[,] and responsive . . . to promote innovation . . . of a disruptive new technology . . .”
Fenwick et al., supra note 170, at 561, 584-85. Resonating with the aforementioned perspective, others
maintain in the context of FinTech that “[r]egulatory sandboxes . . . provide an example of a shift away
from traditional regulatory approaches and represent an attempt to embrace principles of proactive,
dynamic[,] and responsive regulation.” Lev Bromberg, Andrew Godwin & Ian Ramsay, Fintech
Sandboxes: Achieving a Balance between Regulation and Innovation 1 (2017),
https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3090844 (emphasis added). See also id. at 13, 15-19 (promoting a more
proactive regulatory response to disruptive technological innovation such as FinTech).
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As an example of the U.S. government’s response to FinTech, the
SEC regulated P2P lending platforms in line with the extant securities
laws, requiring P2P platforms to sell the notes by prospectus, and file
annual and quarterly reports. In this regard, the SEC’s response to
FinTech firms, such as P2P platforms, was reactive.171 Even though the
GAO, U.S. Treasury, and OCC have considered how to supervise the
growing FinTech industry, their initiatives reflect fragmented regulation
of FinTech. 172 Moreover, the OCC’s proposal of chartering FinTech
firms and regulating them as banks appears to be reactive as well
because it supports the extant entry barriers and banks’ own style of
regulation, which may cost FinTech startups too much time and
money.173
As for the Chinese regulatory response to such FinTech, i.e., P2P
lending, the Chinese government initially adopted a hands-off approach,
but shifted toward a more reactive approach after a number of P2P
failures. 174 The Chinese regulators brought in a list of 12 forbidden
activities under the Interim Measures. As discussed earlier, both the
Guiding Opinions of 2015 and the Interim Measures of 2016 stress that
P2P platforms can only adopt the information intermediation model.175
When it comes to the Taiwanese government response to FinTech,
even though P2P lending in Taiwan developed quite a bit later than in
the U.S. and China,176 the government initially seems to be reactive in
releasing informal guidance, warning the P2P lending industry against
crossing four major red lines, while highly encouraging the industry to
collaborate with banks.177 Nonetheless, Taiwan took a more proactive
approach to FinTech in January 2018, creating a formal regulatory
sandbox regime by enacting the Financial Technology Development and
Innovative Experimentation Act (the “FinTech Sandbox Act”), which
was promulgated by the President on January 31, 2018. 178 In theory,

171. See supra Part I.B.1.
172. See supra Parts I.B.1, 2, & 3.
173. Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 118.
174. Chen & Tsai, supra note 51, at 16-20.
175. See supra Parts II.B & C. Commentators argue that China’s existing system regulating P2P
lending “will exhaustively dictate how P2P lending platforms conduct their business”, and that this
rules-based anti-experimentalism approach lacks responsiveness and flexibility brought by principlesbased experimental approach, probably hampering benefits from the P2P lending industry and stifling
innovation in the sharing economy as a whole. Yu & Shen, supra note 44, at 55. For elaborating on the
distinction between a principles-based regulatory regime and a rules-based regime, see infra Part IV.B.
176. See supra Part III.A.
177. See supra Parts III.B.1 & 3.
178. Jin Rong Ke Ji Fa Zhan Yu Chuang Xin Shi Yan Tiao Li (金融科技發展與創新實驗條例)
[Financial Technology Development and Innovative Experimentation Act] (promulgated and effective
Jan. 31, 2018),
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under this approach, “[r]egulators create a regulatory sandbox in which
they facilitate and encourage a space to experiment,” allowing “the
‘testing’ of new technology-driven services, under the supervision of
regulators” and ensuring “that meaningful data can be gathered for the
evaluation of risk in a safe environment”; the goal of such regulatory
experimentation is that “[s]uch data can then facilitate evidence-based
regulatory reform.”179
This article argues that Taiwan’s legislation of the regulatory sandbox
cannot be proactive only in form. In substance, as a short-term goal in
the reform agenda, a more principles-based strategy of financial
regulation (or “MPBR”) is a key point, as is the regulatory attitude.180
Such institutional philosophy should be embedded in the sandbox
regime to make it “collaborative and dialogical, in the sense that
regulators, incumbents and new service providers are engaged in an ongoing dialogue about the most effective means to gather relevant
information and to identify the most appropriate regulatory model.”181
As a long-term goal toward a structural change in the extant regulation
of incumbents, we would propose reallocating competition authority to a
motivated financial agency. This professional agency would be separate
from and independent of the FSC—the sole financial market watchdog
in Taiwan, charged with both consumer protection and prudential
regulation. The newly created single financial agency would be better
positioned to safeguard competition and innovation enabled by
FinTech.182
B. More Principle-based Financial Regulation (“MPBR”) as
Institutional Philosophy
In designing the regulatory regime for such innovative FinTechenabled financial services as P2P lending, regulators should rethink their
regulatory basis or institutional philosophy especially in the context of
global regulatory competition for attracting FinTech firms and
markets.183 In other words, from the perspective of both the FinTechbased industry and financial regulators, a change in regulatory attitude
https://law.fsc.gov.tw/law/EngLawContent.aspx?lan=E&id=2104&KW=Financial+Technology+Develo
pment+and+Innovative+Experimentation+Act (hereinafter the “FinTech Sandbox Act”).
179. Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 119.
180. See infra Part IV.B.
181. See Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 119; Chang-Hsien Tsai & Kuan-Jung Peng, The
FinTech Revolution and Financial Regulation: The Case of Online Supply-Chain Financing, 4(1) ASIAN
J. L. & SOC’Y 109, 109, 116 (2017). For more explanation on the connection between MPBR and the
regulatory sandbox, see infra Part IV.B.
182. See infra Part IV.D.
183. Fenwick et al., supra note 170, at 584.
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would be needed to address the issue of how FinTech-based products
and services should be regulated.184 What follows is an introduction of
two distinct types of regulatory regimes: a principles-based regulatory
regime and a rules-based regime. A principles-based regime imposes
more flexible compliance obligations. 185 Since the majority of the
potential participants in FinTech industries are start-ups, the principlesbased approach may provide start-ups with the benefit of flexibility in
their infancy; nonetheless, the higher cost of legal compliance associated
with a rules-based approach would be balanced by being more attractive
to investors given that regulatory clarity and legal predictability could be
important for start-ups and investors. 186 Nevertheless, a strategy of
MPBR would help more rapidly respond to the challenges arising from
the complexity and innovative nature of modern financial markets. 187
The MPBR represents a shift in institutional philosophy from a
historically predominant rules-based regulatory regime to a less
prescriptive approach.188
When it comes to general regulatory responses to FinTech,
[i]n between the traditional choices of doing nothing and
developing completely new regulatory frameworks, regulators can
carve out pockets of activities (i.e.[,] defined by product, scope[,]
or scale) where participants can benefit on a case-by-case basis
from regulatory forbearance (such as “no-action” letters in the
United States) or from restricted licenses or special charters (such
as the [U.S.] OCC’s for banks).189
No matter the form through which the government responds to
FinTech, regulatory forbearance, restricted licenses, and special charters
184. Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis, & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of FinTech: A New
Post-Crisis Paradigm, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1271, 1311 (2016).
185. Id. at 1311-12.
186. Id. at 1312.
187. Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 273 (2011). Even if a principles-based regulatory regime may not
provide the clarity and certainty provided by the rules-based regulatory regimes, a principles-based
regulatory regime could be more dynamic and effective in keeping regulatory pace with the times.
ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 303
(2012). See also Allen, supra note 41, at 12 (“As for regulators, the hope is that principles-based
regulation will remain relevant as industry practices change, and thus make regulatory arbitrage more
difficult—it is harder to arbitrage the spirit of a principle than the letter of a narrower rule.”).
188. Awrey, supra note 187, at 282-83 (“MPBR reflects a tacit acknowledgement that the
effectiveness of a regulatory regime in delivering desired regulatory outcomes is a product not just of
statutory design, but also institutional philosophy.”) (emphasis in original).
189. Zetzsche et al., supra note 5, at 58-59 (emphasis in original) (alteration in original). See also
id. at 59 (“The practical effect of forbearance through no-action letters, restricted licensing, or special
charters is that of partial exemptions or dispensation within a broader regulatory framework.”).
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exemplify the spirits of FinTech regulation, which would embrace
regulatory humility, namely risk-based proportionate MPBR. 190 To be
sure, some may be concerned that informal case-by-case regulatory
guidance would be a temporary tool and that, if lasting too long, could
bring about another kind of legal uncertainty. Therefore, regulators of
FinTech firms across an increasing number of jurisdictions including
Taiwan have shifted to a more formal and structured regulatory
experimentation, i.e., regulatory sandboxes, as discussed below.
C. An MPBR-embedded Regulatory Sandbox?
The UK Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) adopted the regulatory
sandbox, permitting “financial innovation to be carried out in
experimental ways within the parameters of regulatory approval and
monitoring.” 191 This regulatory sandbox is a “‘safe place’ in which
businesses can test innovative products, services, business models[,] and
delivery mechanisms without immediately incurring all the normal
regulatory consequences of engaging in the activity in question.”192 On
the one hand, the regulatory sandbox would signify that the FCA
introduced a formal form of proportionate governance without excessive
regulation, which is aligned with the spirit of MPBR. 193 On the other
hand, the UK leading the adoption of the regulatory sandbox indicates a
horizontal experimentation across different jurisdictions that they are
engaging in regulatory competition “naturally” by adjusting their
financial regulation with a view to facilitating the establishment and
operation of domestic and foreign FinTech firms. 194 If a jurisdiction
intends to lead the global regulatory competition for attracting FinTech
firms, MPBR-embedded strategies of policy/regulatory experimentation
190. Tsai & Peng, supra note 181, at 125. At least in the early stage of emerging FinTech
businesses,
when dealing with a new innovative technology, regulators could start by issuing
informal guidance under the umbrella of a pre-existing principles-based framework. By
allowing startups to take a flexible approach to regulatory compliance, rather than
investing limited startup funds on researching legal rules and how to comply with them, a
principles-based approach could encourage innovation by such firms.
Allen, supra note 41, at 15.
191. Iris H-Y Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products,
Intermediation and Markets- Policy Implications for Financial Regulators, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 55,
64 (2016).
192. Regulatory
Sandbox,
FINANCIAL
CONDUCT
AUTHORITY
2
(2015),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf (last visited July 20, 2018).
193. See Chiu, supra note 191, at 64.
194. Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis, & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech and the
Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 376, 408-9 (2017).
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should be pursued with a shift in intuitional philosophy toward lighttouch or humble regulation. 195 As a necessary complement and more
structured change in FinTech regulation, such market-based regulatory
mechanisms as the regulatory sandbox would be supportive to FinTech
development, if regulators grasped the spirit of MPBR that is supposed
to be reflected in the regulatory sandbox, that is, a style of “collaborative
regulation that facilitates . . . policy experimentation.”196
Following the trend of creating the regulatory sandbox as a more
proactive and experimental model, the FSC has also incorporated
versions of the FinTech regulatory sandbox proposed by several crossparty Taiwanese legislators. In December 2017, a synthesized version of
the FinTech Sandbox Act was introduced and, in early 2018, was
formally passed by the legislature and promulgated by the President.
The FinTech Sandbox Act intends to provide a way for FinTech startups
to safely test newly developed FinTech-enabled financial services or
products197 by temporarily exempting them—at least to an extent—from
complex financial regulations. 198 Due to the fact that Taiwan has a
tradition of heavily regulating the financial industry with a rules-based
institutional regime, the FinTech Sandbox Act is important as it is
necessary to enact a statute to thoroughly overcome financial regulatory
barriers to allow both regulators and the regulated to carry out these
policy experiments.199 Without the Act, even if FSC officials wanted to
adopt any regulatory forbearance approach similar to U.S. no-action
letters, restricted licensing, or special charters, judges would probably
hold these forbearance approaches in violation of mandatory law; the
downsides of the forbearance-based case-by-case experimental model
for regulators would be that “the regulators’ conduct may be found to be
negligent if not backed up by the legislature” and that “[t]his prospect of
potential liability may lead to sub-optimal levels of dispensation
practice.”200
195. See Tsai & Peng, supra note 181, at 116, 118. To illustrate whether regulatory choices such
as the regulatory sandbox as a form of regulatory experimentation would affect levels of investment
across jurisdictions, scholars empirically study the government responses to FinTech in 17 jurisdictions.
They find that “in those countries with a more proactive response—particularly involving Regulatory
Guidance or Regulatory Experimentation—there is evidence that this proactive approach makes the
jurisdiction more attractive as a potential location for starting Fin[T]ech operations.” Fenwick et al.,
supra note 169, at 120.
196. See Tsai & Peng, supra note 181, at 126-27; Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 124.
197. The FinTech Sandbox Act, supra note 178, art. 1.
198. The FinTech Sandbox Act, supra note 178, arts. 25-26.
199. Jhih-Cheng Wang (王志誠), Jin Rong Ke Ji Fa Zhan Yu Chuang Xin Shi Yan Tiao Li Zhi Li
Fa Ji Ping Shi (金融科技發展與創新實驗條例之立法及評譯)[ Commentary on Financial Technology
Development and Innovative Experimentation Act], 31(1) CUN KUAN BAO XIAN ZI XUN JI KAN (存款保
險資訊季刊) [CDIC QUARTERLY BULLETIN] 1, 18 (2018).
200. Zetzsche et al., supra note 5, at 62-63.
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In particular, according to experimental results within the sandbox, a
competent authority must review whether existing laws and regulations
should be amended, or whether there is a need to issue regulatory
guidance.201 In addition, on a regular basis, the competent authority is
required to improve itself by reviewing and amending relevant laws and
regulations, while rendering necessary assistance to FinTech
businesses. 202 Theoretically, Taiwan’s legislature would, via these
provisions, embed the institutional philosophy of MPBR in the mindset
of the FSC by creating a collaborative governance environment
premised on real trust and shared understanding. In this environment,
regulators, traditional service providers, and FinTech innovators can
carry on an ongoing, sophisticated, and iterative regulatory dialogue
regarding effective experiments to gather relevant information and to
identify an appropriate regulatory model, while working together “to
ensure that appropriate consumer protection safeguards are built into
201. Art. 17 of the FinTech Sandbox Act stipulates:
(1) Where an innovative experimentation is inventive, effectively increasing the
efficiency of financial services, reducing operational and use costs, or enhancing the
interests of financial consumers and enterprises, the competent authority should
take the following actions in consideration of the implementation status of the
innovative experimentation:
1. Reviewing and revising relevant financial regulations.
2. Providing assistance to the applicant in starting a business or entering into
strategic cooperation [with relevant organization].
3. Making referrals to relevant government agencies (institutions) or
organizations or funds that offer business startup assistance.
(2) If it is decided by the competent authority that relevant financial laws should be
amended, the competent authority should, no later than three (3) months after the
end of the innovative experimentation, complete an amendment draft of the
financial laws and submit the draft to the Executive Yuan for review.
The FinTech Sandbox Act, supra note 178, arts. 17.
202. Paragraphs 2 and 3, Art. 18 of the FinTech Sandbox Act provide:
(1) The competent authority should establish and periodically review financial
technology development policy, actively provide financial technology enterprises
with necessary assistance, guidance and counseling services, and regularly invite
representatives of the financial technology industry and representatives of related
government agencies to discuss and coordinate financial technology development
related matters. The guidance and assistance mechanism for financial technology
development will be prescribed by the competent authority.
(2) The competent authority shall, within three (3) months after the end of each year,
submit a written report to the Legislative Yuan on the promotion of financial
technology development, the results of innovative experimentation and regulatory
amendments made therefor for the year, and disclose the content of the report on its
website.
The FinTech Sandbox Act, supra note 178, art. 18, ¶ 2 - 3.
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new products and services.”203 Notably, the shift toward MPBR via the
legislative sandbox would not necessarily be a deregulatory move
because closer supervision/engagement between FinTech enterprises
and financial authorities could effectively substitute for the clearer limits
to business models currently imposed by hard rules; such strict
regulatory scrutiny into FinTech startups is advocated by legacy
financial institutions. Some might wonder: in practice, could the
Taiwanese regulatory sandbox effectively prevent such FinTech
industry, like P2P lending, from excessive exposure to legal risks due to
regulatory uncertainty of business models, since Articles 17 and 18 of
the FinTech Sandbox Act appear to have established a regulatory regime
where regulators and the regulated can collaborate, carry on a dialogue,
and experiment with what would be more appropriate regulatory
approaches?
D. The Political Economy of Regulating P2P Lending and Its
Implications for FinTech Regulation in Taiwan
The enactment of Articles 17 and 18 of the FinTech Sandbox Act
might merely be a temporary tool to spur a shift in the institutional
philosophy of Taiwanese financial regulators in the short term. At least
in the long run, Taiwan could consider reforming the structure of its
financial regulatory system by adopting a stronger authority to safeguard
financial competition and innovation where prudential regulation
concerns do not always predominate over consumer FinTech
competition and innovation. A professional consumer financial
competition body that is separate from and independent of the FSC,
possessing exclusive control over its own rulemaking, supervision, and
enforcement of consumer financial competition measures in Taiwan,
would benefit FinTech development contributing to digital financial
inclusion.
Specifically, the FinTech Sandbox Act tasked the FSC with
publishing regulations and rules for the Act to be implemented. 204
Accordingly, the FSC issued a press release in April 2018 and
announced the FinTech Sandbox Act would be officially implemented
on April 30, 2018,205 while adding an appendix titled “Instructions and
203. See Tsai & Peng, supra note 181, at 117, 126; Awrey, supra note 187, at 285-86; Zetzsche et
al., supra note 5, at 61-62, 79; Regulatory Sandbox Lessons Learned Report, FINANCIAL CONDUCT
AUTHORITY 3 (2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandboxlessons-learned-report.pdf (hereinafter “Regulatory Sandbox Report”).
204. See, e.g., The FinTech Sandbox Act, supra note 178, art. 18, ¶ 1.
205. See Press Release, Fin. Supervisory Commission, Jin Rong Ke Ji Fa Zhan Yu Chuang Xin
Shi Yan Tiao Li Ji San Xiang Shou Quan Fa Qui Jiang Yu Yi Ling Qi Nian Si Yue San Shi Ri Shi Xing
[Financial Technology Development and Innovative Experimentation Act Is about to Be Implemented
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FAQ of Financial Technology Innovative Experimentation Laws and
Regulations” (“Sandbox FAQ”).206 The Sandbox FAQ states that under
the FinTech Sandbox Act, the term “innovative experimentation” means
utilizing technological innovation or business model innovation to
undertake experimentation of financial business that requires the
permission, approval, or concession of the competent authority, and that
if any innovative experiment is not made on the aforementioned
financial business (e.g., P2P lending platforms), there is no need for
application to the FSC. 207 Why did the FSC give this unwelcome
informal guidance for the P2P lending? This unfriendly guidance could
allegedly be traced back to 2016, when the FSC had initially taken a
reactive approach by issuing a press release in April 2016 and releasing
its FinTech White Paper in May 2016, suggesting that P2P lending
platforms would (or should) merely act as an information intermediary.
In practice, we cannot but doubt that “the strength of industry groups
and labor” may have “want[ed] to curb incentives to FinTech firms and
support existing subsidies and barriers to entry.” 208 This is especially
apparent based on the FSC officials’ 2016 decision to highly encourage
banks and P2P platforms to collaborate with each other as it was the
FSC’s aim to pressure FinTech-based P2P platforms to comply with
existing law and regulations applied to banks—thus, “supporting the

on
Apr.
30,
2018]
(Apr.
26,
2018),
https://www.fsc.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=96&parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=news_view.jsp&dataserno=2
01804260001&aplistdn=ou=news,ou=multisite,ou=chinese,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtable=News
[hereinafter “Sandbox Press Release”].
206. Jin Rong Ke Ji Chuang Xin Shi Yan Fa Gui Wen Da Ji [Instructions and FAQ of Financial
Technology Innovative Experimentation Laws and Regulations], FIN. SUPERVISORY COMMISSION (Apr.
26,
2018),
https://www.mjib.gov.tw/userfiles/files/35%E6%B4%97%E9%8C%A2%E9%98%B2%E5%88%B6%E8%99%95/files/%E5%AF%A6%E5%8B
%99%E5%95%8F%E7%AD%94/02-06-13.pdf (last visited July 21, 2018) (hereinafter Sandbox FAQ).
207. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
208. See Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 118; Amos Chen, P2P Ye Zhe Yu Yin Hang Zhu Guan
Ji Guan De San Jiao Xi Ti San Fang Wu Fa Hao Hao He Zuo Dou Shi Ka Zai Xin Ren Wen Ti [The
Triangular Relations among P2P Companies, Banks and the Competent Authority: Lack of Trust
Contributes to Collaborative Failure among the Three Parties], TECHORANGE (July 26, 2016),
https://buzzorange.com/techorange/2016/07/26/p2p-taiwan/. As discussed below, the FSC’s aggressive
calls for P2P platforms’ partnering with rather than competing against banks constitute a type of entry
barriers to digital innovation. See Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of
Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 234 (2018). Moreover, “banks are publicly subsidized and insulated
from competition.” Id.
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extant financial system and their own style of regulation.” 209 Along
these lines, the Taiwanese government appears to have shifted to a more
proactive response to FinTech by legislating the FinTech Sandbox Act
to permit cautious regulatory experimentation. This shift, however, is
arguably just in form—the FSC, in substance, may be more committed
to the existing style of regulation, lacking incentives to abandon the
current approach in favor of the newly mandated alternative approach.
This may be because the FSC could be subject to regulatory capture,
regulatory inertia, and the tendency of government agencies to be averse
to risk.210 Ergo, even a more structured change in the current financial
regulation such as the FinTech Sandbox Act might also be troubled by
the FSC’s conservative implementation; 211 we might therefore expect
the effectiveness of the Taiwanese legislative sandbox to be limited as
commentators similarly argue that “there is a risk that prioritizing
209. See supra Part III.B.1; GU ET AL., supra note 128, at 159-60, 173. See also Editorial, Jin
Guan Hui Jian Guan Si Wei De Yan Hua [The Evolving Regulatory Philosophy of the Financial
Supervisory Commission], GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Taiwan) (May 2, 2018),
at A2 (noting that the FSC’s policy on P2P lending platforms is to encourage banks to invest in those
platforms to acquire control or even 100% shareholding and thus to have those platforms comply with
existing law and regulations applied to banks). We have discussed that the OCC has considered
possibilities of offering special-purpose FinTech charters in Part I.B.4. Similar to FSC’s calls for
partnering with banks, “[t]he OCC emphasized that the new license would not ‘weaken the competitive
position of existing banks,’ but, if anything, would ‘level the playing field’ by ensuring regulations
currently applied to national banks also applied to [F]in[T]ech.” Van Loo, supra note 208, at 260.
210. See supra Part IV.A; MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS
AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 358 (2009) (noting that “Economists have predicted that the incentive
structure faced by bureaucrats will lead to unduly risk-averse decision-making, producing an
inefficiently high level of regulation.”) (emphasis added). Government agencies such as the FSC tend to
be averse to risk, “defensive, threat-avoiding, scandal-minimizing,” and “reluctant to take on activities
that embrace seemingly intractable problems and that are fraught with the danger of unintended
consequences including regulatory failure and criticism.” STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 192, at 348
(footnotes omitted). This might also be due to regulatory inertia, i.e., “the tendency of regulators to
adhere to their original proposed rules and to resist change, even when that change may make rules more
effective.” Asaf Eckstein, Regulatory Inertia and Interest Groups: How the Structure of the Rulemaking
Process Affects the Substance of Regulations 1, 7-11, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2285593 (last visited
July 21, 2018). See also Bromberg et al., supra note 170, at 13, 15 (arguing that regulators should avoid
regulatory inertia, and be more proactive and adaptive in regulating new technologies and business
models as in the FinTech industry). For other applications of regulatory/institutional inertia, see, e.g.,
Melissa J. Luttrell, The Social Cost of Inertia: How Cost-Benefit Incoherence Threatens to Derail U.S.
Climate Action, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 131 (2014); Cass R. Sunstein, On Not Revisiting
Official Discount Rates: Institutional Inertia and the Social Cost of Carbon (Oct. 21,
2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2343379.
211. See Editorial, Ping Yi Wang Lu Yin Hang Zhi Zhao De Bao Shou Zheng Ce [Commentary on
the Conservative Policy for Online Bank Licensure], GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES]
(Taiwan), (July 3, 2018), at A2 (hereinafter Conservative Policy) (noting that even though the
legislature enacted the FinTech Sandbox Act with the strong ambition to encourage financial innovation,
the FSC is so conservative in implementation that many startups with blockchain technologies and
financial innovations decide not to apply for entrance into the sandbox and even relocate their whole
teams overseas after finding from the officials that staying within the sandbox would expose their
technology and business development to more uncertainty).
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Fin[T]ech can slide into . . . empty lip service aimed at projecting an
image of regulatory action when, in reality, action is limited.”212
What implications can be drawn from the regulation of P2P lending
for FinTech regulation at large in Taiwan? From an institutional design
perspective, we would propose reallocating competition authority to a
motivated financial agency to provide long-term regulatory certainty for
FinTech-driven financial market development by stimulating financial
competition and innovation. Firstly, some would propose finding an
existing agency to be reallocated the authority of FinTech
supervision.213 To be sure, the FinTech Sandbox Act stipulates that the
term “competent authority” as used in this Act shall mean the FSC, and
that “[t]o develop innovative financial technologies, assist in innovative
experimentation applications, and review and evaluate the feasibility
and effectiveness of innovative experimentation in a professional
manner, the competent authority should have a dedicated unit in place to
handle related matters.” 214 Accordingly, the FSC establishes the
Financial Technology Development and Innovative Center (the
“FinTech Sandbox Center”). 215 However, the Sandbox Center is still
placed under the FSC and easily subject to the drawbacks of regulatory
capture and inertia. In addition, mission conflict would haunt the

212. Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 119. Being seen doing something had tangible benefits for
both legislators and the FSC as executive-branch rule-makers and enforcers. This political action is well
described by Aviram’s bias arbitrage theory. See, e.g., Amitai Aviram, Bias Arbitrage, 64 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 789 (2007); Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating
Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2006). For an application of the bias arbitrage theory to
financial regulation, see Tsai, supra note 11, at 239-43. We may observe a similar phenomenon in the
case of equity crowdfunding regulations in Taiwan, where a gap may exist “between rhetoric (publicspirited justifications) and reality (rent-seeking),” as the public choice explanation predicts. See Tsai,
supra note 45, at 267-77.
213. WANG ET AL., supra note 59, at 292.
214. The FinTech Sandbox Act, supra note 178, art. 2.
215. Fin. Supervisory Commission, Jin Rong Ke Ji Fa Zhan Yu Chuang Xin Zhong Xin She Zhi
Yao Dian Ji Zu Zhi Tu [Establishment Guidelines and Organizational Chart for the Financial
Technology
Development
and
Innovative
Center]
(Feb.
22,
2018),
https://www.fsc.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=479&parentpath=0,7,478&mcustomize=onemessages_view.jsp
&dataserno=201602230001&aplistdn=ou=data,ou=20160223020901,ou=one,ou=chinese,ou=ap_root,o
=fsc,c=tw&dtable=O20160223020901. See also Fin. Supervisory Commission, Important Measures:
Preview of Draft Regulations Proposed in Accordance with the Authorization by the Financial
Technology Development and Innovative Experimentation Act (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.fsc.gov.tw/en/home.jsp?id=74&parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=multimessage_view.jsp&dat
aserno=201804110001&aplistdn=ou=bulletin,ou=multisite,ou=english,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&dtable=
Bulletin (indicating that “the FSC has expanded the role and function of the FinTech Office and changed
its name to ‘Financial Technology Development and Innovation Center,’ which is responsible for tasks,
such as developing Fin[T]ech and conducting innovative experiments. The Center also provides
counseling and coaching service on Fin[T]ech business.”).
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FinTech Sandbox Center under the FSC,216 since the FSC (charged with
a predominant focus on prudential regulation), like U.S. prudential
regulators, would focus more on the safety and soundness of banks than
financial competition and innovation.217
Therefore, at least in the long run, we propose a further structural
change in the extant financial system and their own style of regulation,
that is, creating a professional agency that is separate from the FSC (the
sole financial market watchdog in Taiwan); the newly created single
financial agency can provide a truly independent perspective, so as to
mitigate the mission conflict conundrum because of trying to pursue
financial competition and innovation through a naturally conservative
prudential regulator. On the one hand, this reallocation of the authority
of financial competition and innovation to a newly created single
financial agency would better position regulators to safeguard healthy
market competition and navigate innovation enabled by FinTech
contributing to digital financial inclusion. 218 On the other hand, the
creation of such a new agency is also in line with the objective of
creating FCA’s seminal regulatory sandbox—“promoting effective
competition in the interests of consumers”. 219 Moreover, this more

216. See Van Loo, supra note 208, at 269 (“Interdisciplinary research has underscored that in
designing regulators, ‘a key danger to avoid is giving a single agency conflicting responsibilities.’”)
(footnote omitted).
217. See Tsai, supra note 11, at 222 (indicating that the FSC “under the current financial
regulatory architecture is a unified regulator and tends to focus more on prudential regulation concerns .
. . .”). For mission conflict, especially in the context of U.S. FinTech regulation, see Van Loo, supra
note 208, at 236-37, 263, 270. See also id., at 257 (illustrating that “regulators focused on bank safety
and soundness may view competition as a threat to their primary mandate. These two themes—
insufficient attention to competition and overemphasizing the survival of big banks—permeate the
institutional design flaws that undercut financial innovation.”).
218. As mentioned in Part IV.C, during the legislative process of the FinTech Sandbox Act,
startups and Wan-Ju Yu, a leading legislator from the ruling party (who is one of the main advocates for
startups), used to call for the competent authority of the FinTech Sandbox should be elevated to as highlevel as the Cabinet so as to have a more independent perspective from the FSC’s; however, due to
considerations to have the bill passed as soon as possible, the version with the FSC as the competent
authority was ultimately passed. Syueh-Huei Lu (呂雪彗), Jian Li Sha He Jin Rong Yeh Shuai Sian Shih
Yan (監理沙盒 金融業率先實驗) [The Financial Sector Would Be Forerunners in Experimenting with
the Regulatory Sandbox], JHONG SHIH DIAN ZIH BAO (中時電子報) [CHINA TIMES], (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20170220000027-260202. Therefore, our regulatory proposal
is intended to focus the mission of consumer financial competition and innovation, including
rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement, in the hands of a single professional agency, who would be
at least at the same hierarchical level as the FSC, while simultaneously independent of it. Of course,
fleshing out the detailed regulatory design of the new agency charged with the authority of financial
competition and innovation would remain a difficult issue requiring more research. In my further
research, I would give detail of the alternative structure that I envision, including how much and what
form of regulatory authority this agency would have, how “independent” such an agency would need to
be (e.g., to what degree it would be susceptible to oversight, and therefore external influences), and just
as significant, who would coordinate the inevitable overlap with the prudential regulator (and how).
219. Regulatory Sandbox Report, supra note 203, at 3.
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proactive response would help prevent local Taiwanese FinTech startups
from voting with feet;220 this more proactive approach would meanwhile
help Taiwan’s government keep regulatory pace with other jurisdictions
in the global regulatory competition for innovative FinTech startups.221
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The U.S. reactively regulated P2P lending start-ups under its extant
securities regulations, setting forth regulation that may be intentionally
strict so as to contain industrial development. In contrast, after a slew of
major P2P scandals, including outright criminal violations, the Chinese
government abandoned the initial hands-off regulatory approach and
became reactive as well, by requiring business models of Chinese P2P
lending to be limited to the information intermediation. Therefore, in
China, other models, such as the asset securitization model or debt
assignment model, can no longer be adopted.
When it comes to government responses to P2P lending in Taiwan,
the FSC had been reactive by highly encouraging collaboration between
P2P platforms and banks, actually implying that the platforms need to
comply with laws and regulations applied to banks. The Taiwanese
government became more proactive when it enacted the statute to
implement the regulatory sandbox, the FinTech Sandbox Act, in January
2018. However, such a proactive shift in response to FinTech may have
been proactive in form alone, as the legislative sandbox may not be an
effective means to address regulatory dilemmas between prudential
regulation and financial competition and innovation. Whereas the
legislature attempted to embed the institutional philosophy in the FSC
via the FinTech Sandbox Act, the FSC would in practice remain reactive
in response to FinTech, such as P2P lending, by continuing to engage in
conservative implementation, while maintaining a predominantly
prudential focus due to being susceptible to regulatory capture and
inertia. This pattern of activity prioritizes financial stability over
financial competition and innovation. Therefore, at least in the long run,
a structural change in institutional design of the financial system may be
necessary to spur a transformation of the regulatory attitude of financial
regulators towards an MPBR strategy of collaborative dialogical
governance.
In order to refrain from forcing FinTech startups to exit from Taiwan
220. See Fenwick et al., supra note 169, at 120.
221. Conservative Policy, supra note 211 (highlighting that the FSC is quite conservative in
implementing the FinTech Sandbox Act such that many startups with blockchain technologies and
financial innovations decide not to apply for entrance into the sandbox and even relocate their whole
teams overseas).
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and relocate overseas due to long-term regulatory uncertainty, we could
preliminarily consider a holistic reform agenda, i.e., adopting a fully
independent consumer financial competition watchdog. With a newly
created single professional agency playing the role of promoting
financial competition and innovation for consumers independently from
the FSC, the concerns of fostering healthy competition in offering
digital financial services or products such as P2P lending to traditionally
underserved consumers might be brought a real step closer from the
periphery of Taiwan’s domestic financial system, to the power found at
its apex.
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